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Abstract
Thi s paper  presents a r eview  of  t he r ecent  econom i cs l i t erature i n t he area of  i l l i cit   drug use.  
Par t i cular  att enti on  i s pai d  t o  t he  econom i cs of  addi cti on  and  t he  r ati onal   addi cti on  m odel ,   t he 
we l f are econom i cs f r am ew ork  f or  analysi ng  t he  social  costs of  drug  use,   and  t he  att em pts t hat  
have been m ade by econom i sts to evaluat e recent or proposed pol i cy int ervent i ons.  A
dom i nant  them e i n t hi s review  is the probl em  of poor dat a avail abil i t y.  Thi s is part i cularl y 
t r ue wh e n   i t   com es t o i mp l em enti ng t he Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on m odel ,   but   i t   i s also apparent  i n 
t he l i t erature on est i ma t i ng t he costs of  i l l i cit   drug use t o society as a w hol e.  On e   of  t he ma i n 
concl usi ons of t hi s review  is that  unt i l  recentl y publ i c pol i cy has not  been part i cularl y
i nfl uenced by research carr i ed out  by econom i sts. It  is not  clear wh e t her thi s is because
econom i sts have had t o grappl e wi t h i nadequat e dat a,  and hence t hei r   concl usi ons are couched 
i n  uncert aint y,   or  wh e t her  i t   i s because drugs  r esearchers have  assum ed a very  l i mi t ed r ol e f or 
econom i sts i n  t hei r   analysi s. 
*  Publ i c Sector  Econom i cs R esearch Ce nt r e,  De p a r t me n t   of  Econom i cs,  Un i versit y  of  Lei cester.   I   am  grateful   t o 
St eve Pudney  f or  hel pful   c o mme n t s and  suggest i ons  on  an earl i er  draft .   Re ma i ni ng  err ors and  om i ssions  are t he 
sole  r esponsi bi l i t y  of  t he  author.2
1. Introduction 
The  purpose  of   t hi s paper  i s t o  provi de  an overvi ew  of  t he  l i t erature t hat   has  consi dered i l l i cit  
drug use fr om  an econom i cs perspecti ve.  The i m port ance of thi s type of review  cannot  be 
overem phasi sed.  I n a r ecent  edit ori al  of  t he j ournal  D rug and Al cohol   Review ,  John Bri dges
of  t he Na t i onal   Bur eau of  Econom i c R esearch expressed seri ous concern over  t he r eluct ance 
of drug researchers and pol i cy m akers to i ncorporate econom i cs int o drug research. He  
concl uded  t hat :
… U n l ess il l i cit  drug researchers and pol i cy m akers all ow  advances i n t he
understandi ng of t he econom i cs of i l l i cit  drugs t o bet t er i nform r esearch and 
pol i cy, prospect s for devel opi ng m ore eff ecti ve responses are dism al.  (Br i dges,  
1999,   p.   252).
Qu i t e w hy  t hi s concern  shoul d  ari se wi l l   becom e apparent  as we   proceed,  alt hough  i t   i s wo r t h 
not i ng  t hat   i n  t he  US,   i t   has  been argued  t hat   drugs  pol i cy i s f ormu l ated wi t h  very  l i t t l e r egard 
t o  any  r esearch,  i r r especti ve  of  di scipl i ne  ( Re ut er,   2001).
I l l i cit  drug use,  by defi ni t i on,  is a covert  acti vi t y and as such i s not  we l l  understood,  
alt hough  i t s consequences  are easil y  observed  and  att r act  consi derable me d i a and  governm ent  
att enti on.   I ndeed,  r ecent  governm ent s have pl aced a hi gh pri ori t y on addressing drugs i ssues, 
wi t h  t he  curr ent  adm ini str ati on  appoi nt i ng a senior  civi l   servant   ( t he so-call ed ‘ Dr ugs Ts ar ’ )  
t o oversee t he i mp l em entati on of  a t en-year  pl an t o t ackle drug mi suse ( Ho me   Of f i ce,  1998).  
I t  shoul d be not ed, how ever,  that  pol i cies aime d  a t  tackli ng drugs m i suse are li kel y t o be 
di f f i cult   t o  i mp l em ent  and  evaluat e i f   t he  understandi ng  of  how   i l l i cit   drugs  ma r ket s operate i s 
l i mi t ed.  For   exam ple,  i f   pol i cies are desi gned t o r estr i ct  suppl y and hence i ncrease t he str eet 
pri ce f or  drugs,   t hi s wi l l   onl y be desi r able i f   pol i cy ma k e r s are aw are of  t he pri ce sensit i vi t y 
of dem and.  Un f ort unat ely,  unt i l  recentl y t he st udy of the econom i cs of il l i cit  drugs m arket s 
has  been characteri sed by  a l i t erature t hat   has  an understandabl e i mb a l ance bet w een em pir i cal 
and t heoreti cal  ( or  hypot het i cal)   cont r i but i ons.   Thi s i mb a l ance i s understandabl e because t he 
nat ure of  i l l i cit   drugs ma r ket s ma k e s   t he coll ecti on of  r eli able dat a di f f i cult .   Ha v i ng said t hi s, 
i n  t he  absence of  r eli able dat a,  som e i m port ant  t heoreti cal  advances  i nt o  our  understandi ng  of 
drug addi cti on have been ma d e .   I n part i cular,   econom i sts have sought   t o r ati onal i se addi cti on 
i n t he sense t hat  it  represents indi vi dual l y opt i ma l  behavi our that  conforms  t o t he cl assical 
not i on of  ut i l i t y ma x i mi sati on.   The  t heory of  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on ( B ecker  and Mu r phy,   1988) 3
r epresents the m ost  signi f i cant t heoreti cal cont r i but i on i n t hi s respect,  and i t  has heavi l y 
i nfl uenced t he em pir i cal  wo r k t hat   has f ol l ow ed.   We   wi l l   consi der  t hi s cont r i but i on i n mo r e 
det ail   i n  Secti on  2.  
For t unat ely,  in t he l ast tw o decades suit able dat a have becom e avail able that  all ow  
r esearchers to consi der som e of t he i ssues that  have been t hrow n up by t he t heoreti cal
l i t erature. Typi call y t here are two  a r eas that  receive at t enti on.  Fi r stl y,  a num ber of att em pts 
have been m ade t o quant i f y som e of t he soci al costs of i l l i cit  drug use,  part i cularl y
product i vi t y  eff ects and  t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een drug  use  and  cri me ,   alt hough,   as we   wi l l   see 
l ater,   t he  extent  t o  wh i ch t hi s has  been successful   i n  i nfl uenci ng  pol i cy i s debat able.  Secondly,  
a consi derable proport i on of the l i t erature has focussed on t he dem and for il l i cit  drugs and 
how  sensit i ve i t   i s t o pri ce changes.  I n t hi s r espect,   r esearchers have also t r i ed t o det ermi ne 
t he relati onshi p bet w een legal drug use (alcohol  and t obacco) and i l l i cit  drug use,   and how  
changes in t he pri ce of the forme r  ma y  a f f ect the dem and for the l att er.  Ho we v e r ,  all  thi s 
r esearch m ust com e w it h a healt h w arni ng.  Il l i cit  drug use rem ains covert ,  and m uch of the 
dat a are f r om  self -com pl eti on  surveys  or  are deri ved.  
Thi s paper proceeds as fol l ow s.  In t he next  secti on w e consi der t he econom i cs of
addi cti on,   payi ng part i cular  att enti on t o t he t heory of  Ra t i onal   A ddi t i on,   and how  i t   has been 
i mp l em ented em pir i call y.  W e show  t hat  t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  i s a part i cularl y
i mp o r t ant  cont r i but i on t o t he l i t erature as i t   chall enges t he vi ew  t hat   drug users are m yopi c, 
i r r ati onal ,  and i nsensi t i ve t o changes i n pri ce. Ho we v e r ,  we  a l so consi der som e theoreti cal 
extensions t o t he basi c Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on f r am ew ork,   and t r y t o det ermi ne w het her there is 
any  evidence  t o  cast  doubt   on  t he  assum pti ons  t hat   dri ve  t he  m odel .   Fol l ow i ng  t hi s di scussion,  
i n Secti on 3 we   expl ore t he we l f are econom i cs l i t erature t o see wh a t   i t   can off er  i n t erms   of 
analysi ng t he soci al costs of drug abuse.  We  s t art  by presenti ng t he basi c fr am ew ork for 
analysi s, wh i ch considers the possi bl e divergence bet w een the pri vat e costs faced by drug 
users in m aki ng t hei r  consum pt i on deci sions and t he soci al costs that  ma y  a r i se as a
consequence of thi s consum pt i on.  We  c o n s i der each possibl e cause of thi s divergence and 
det ermi ne w het her there is any support  in t he l i t erature for these concerns.  Fol l ow i ng t hi s 
di scussion of  t he we l f are econom i cs f r am ew ork,   we   bri efl y t urn our  att enti on t o t he general 
pol i cy debat e (i . e. wh e t her psychoact i ve drugs ought  t o be prohi bi t ed or regul ated).  We  
concl ude  t he  paper  by  scrut i ni sing  curr ent  drugs  pol i cies and  t he  contr i but i on  of  econom i cs t o 
t he f ormu l ati on and evaluat i on of  t hese i nt ervent i ons.   I n part i cular,   we   consi der  t he me r i t s of 
suppl y-side  and  dem and-si de  pol i cies i n  r educi ng  drug  consum pt i on,   and  wh e t her  t here i s any 
evidence t hat  changes in drugs pri ces have a not i ceable eff ect on consum er dem and.  We  4
f i ni sh the paper by sum m ari sing t he m ai n cont r i but i ons t hat  em erge fr om  t he econom i cs
l i t erature.
2. The Economics of Addiction
A ny analysi s of il l i cit  drugs ul t i ma t ely requi r es som e refl ecti on on t he nat ure of addi cti on,  
part i cularl y  harmf ul   addi cti on.   Al t hough  i t   i s argued  t hat   cert ain  drugs  are not   associated wi t h 
addi cti on (e.g. cannabi s is oft en claime d  t o be non-addi cti ve i n a physi cal sense),  t he
consum pt i on of  psychoact i ve drugs i s generall y consi dered t o r epresent  addi cti ve behavi our.  
I n econom i cs, a good i s typi call y defi ned as addi cti ve i f  an increase in t he st ock of past  
consum pt i on result s in an i ncrease in curr ent consum pt i on,  ceteris pari bus ( B ecker et al . ,
1994).  The pr i ma r y concern for econom i sts is w hether or not  the consum pt i on of addi cti ve 
goods represents indi vi dual l y opt i ma l  behavi our,  or wh e t her addi cted peopl e behave
i r r ati onal l y.  The l att er argum ent  w as seri ousl y quest i oned by t he publ i cati on of B ecker and 
Mu r phy’s (1988) t heory of Ra t i onal  A ddi cti on,  wh i ch bui l t  upon a m odel  of addi cti on
i nt r oduced  by  St i gl er  and  B ecker  ( 1977).  
2.1 Rational Addiction
I n t he R at i onal  A ddi cti on m odel ,  addi cted indi vi dual s are show n t o exhi bi t  consi stent,
f orwa r d-l ooki ng and i ndi vi dual l y opt i ma l   behavi our.   The  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on m odel   has been 
wi del y di scussed since i t s publ i cati on,   and i n t hi s secti on we   provi de a bri ef  exposi t i on of  t he 
t heory  ( f or  mo r e det ail ed di scussions  see Gr ossm an et  al . ,   1998a;   Ne r i   and  He a t her,   1995;   and 
St evenson,  1994b,   and f or  a r eint erpretati on of  t he m odel   see Fer guson,   2000).
1  The  B ecker-
Mu r phy  t heory  of  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  proceeds as f ol l ow s.   I ndi vi dual s can consum e  t wo   t ypes 
of  good:   one  t hat   i s addi cti ve  (c)  and  a com posi t e of  non-addi cti ve  goods  ( y).   Ut i l i t y  at  t i me   t ,  
u(t ) ,   i s assum ed t o be dependent   on curr ent  consum pt i on of  t he addi cti ve good,  c(t ) ,   and non-
addi cti ve goods,  y(t ) ,  pl us a m easure of previous addi cti ve consum pt i on,  call ed the st ock of 
consum pt i on capi t al (S).  The s t ock of consum pt i on capi t al captures the process of learni ng 
about  the eff ects of the addi cti ve goods t hrough previous consum pt i on experi ence (e.g.  the 
r eli ef fr om  st r ess or simp l e escape fr om  reali t y gai ned t hrough consum i ng ‘mi nd-al t eri ng’
1  Al so,  f or  a mo r e general  di scussion  of  t he  econom i cs of  habi t   f orma t i on  and  addi cti on  see M essini s ( 1999)  and 
B ecker  ( 1992);   and  f or  an overvi ew  of  bot h  econom i c and  ot her  approaches t o  addi cti on  see Buc k e t   al .   ( 1996) 
and  M ont oya  and  At ki nson  ( 2000).5
drugs),  pl us previous l i f e experi ences. Thi s stock ent ers the ut i l i t y funct i on as i t  aff ects the 
sati sfacti on  deri ved  f r om   curr ent  consum pt i on.   Wr i t t en f orma l l y,   ut i l i t y  at  t i me   t   i s gi ven  by:
) ] . ( ) , ( ) , ( [ ) ( t S t c t y u t u =
2 ( 1)
The  stock of  consum pt i on capit al  or  ‘ addi cti ve stock’  i s t r eated as a simp l e i nvest me n t  
f unct i on,  wh i ch depreciates at a rate d (wh i ch represents the depl eti on of the physi cal and 
me n t al  eff ects of  past   consum pt i on).   The  r ate of  change of  t hi s addi cti ve  stock  i s gi ven  by:
) . ( ) ( ) (t S t c t S d − = & ( 2)
I f  indi vi dual s li ve for lengt h of li f e T, and have a const ant rate of ti me  p r eference, s,
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wh i ch, accordi ng t o rati onal  choi ce theory,  an indi vi dual  wi l l  ma x i mi se subject t o an
expendi t ure constr aint  and t he i nvest me n t  const r aint  (2).  The expendi t ure constr aint  i s a 
f unct i on of w ealt h at  ti me  t ,  the i nt erest rate in a perf ectl y com peti t i ve capit al ma r ket ,  the 
pri ce of  t he addi cti ve good ( t he pri ce of  t he com posi t e good,  y,  i s norma l i sed t o 1),   and t he 
i ncom e  per  peri od.   I n  addi t i on  t o  t hese  t wo   const r aint s,  i t   i s assum ed t hat   consum pt i on  of  c  i n 
peri od  t   i s non-negati ve,   and  t hat   w ealt h  i n  t he  f ol l ow i ng  peri od  mu s t   be  posi t i ve.  
The f i nal  part  of the m odel  is to relate thi s rati onal  choi ce of ut i l i t y m axi mi sati on t o 
addi cti ve behavi our.  Two i m port ant aspects of addi cti ve behavi our are considered, bot h of 
wh i ch r elate t o t he consum pt i on capit al  stock.   Fi r stl y,   i t   i s assum ed t hat   harmf ul   addi cti on i s 
characteri sed by  t he  physi ol ogi cal  propert y  of  t ol erance:  “given  l evels of  consum pt i on  are l ess 
sati sfyi ng w hen past  consum pt i on has been greater” (B ecker and M urphy,  1988,  p.   682).   I n 
ot her  wo r ds,   t he  mo r e an i ndi vi dual   has  consum ed  i n  peri od  t -1,  t he  l ow er  t he  ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y 
of  consum pt i on i n peri od t   ( i . e.  hi gher  l evels of  consum pt i on are r equi r ed t o yi eld t he sam e 
2  Al t ernat i vel y,   mo r e str uct ur e coul d  be  i m posed  on  t he  ut i l i t y  f unct i on  by  assum ing  t hat   c(t )   and  S( t )   enter  i nt o 
ut i l i t y vi a an int erme d i ate product i on funct i on,  wh e r e the out put  i s som ethi ng l i ke euphori a or pl easure 
( Cha l oupka,   1991).6
ut i l i t y).  Thus,  assum ing ut i l i t y at  t i me  t  i s a concave funct i on requi r es that
. 0 ) ( ) ( < ≡ ∂ ∂ s u t S t u
3 The second characteri sti c of addi cti on i s the reinforcem ent eff ect,
0 ) ( ) ( > ∂ ∂ t S t c ,  wh e r eby greater past  consum pt i on raises the m argi nal  ut i l i t y of curr ent 
consum pt i on,  and hence l eads to an i ncrease in curr ent and fut ure consum pt i on (i . e. curr ent 
and past   consum pt i on are com plem ents).   Thus i t   i s assum ed t hat   . 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
2 > ≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ cS u t S t c t u
I f   addi cts we r e not   r ati onal   t hey w oul d onl y pay att enti on t o t he r einforcem ent  eff ect,   but   i n 
t hi s m odel   drug users are r ati onal   and  so mu s t   t ake i nt o  account   bot h  eff ects.  Thus  B ecker  and 
Mu r phy show  t hat  t he reinforcem ent eff ect mu s t  out we i gh t he t ol erance eff ect.  In ot her 
wo r ds,   t he  posi t i ve  eff ect  of  an i ncrease i n  t he  stock  of  consum pt i on  on  t he  ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y  of
curr ent  consum pt i on  mu s t   exceed t he  negat i ve  eff ect  of  a greater  stock  of  consum pt i on  on  t he 
f ut ure harm  f r om   greater  curr ent  consum pt i on  ( Buc k  et  al . ,   1996).  
W e can now  bri ng t he com ponent s of t he m odel  t oget her t o see how  addicti ve
behavi our  i s characteri sed by r ati onal i t y.   Fol l ow i ng B ecker et  al .   ( 1991),   t he i mp l i cati ons of 
t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  are il l ust r ated graphi call y i n Fi gure 1. The curve A1 relates 
consum pt i on t o t he addi cti ve st ock for an indi vi dual  wi t h a gi ven concave ut i l i t y funct i on,
r ate of  t i me   preference,  set  pri ces f or  addi cti ve and non-addi cti ve goods,   and gi ven w ealt h.   I t  
can be  t hought   of  as a dem and  curve  f or  t he  addi cti ve  good.   The  r ay f r om   t he  ori gi n,   c(t ) =dS,
i s the st eady st ate li ne w here curr ent consum pt i on of the addi cti ve good j ust  off sets the 
depreciati on of  t he stock of  consum pt i on capit al.   I f   A1  i s bel ow  t he steady state l i ne,   curr ent 
consum pt i on does not  off set the decl i ne i n consum pt i on st ock.  Thi s m eans that  S begi ns t o 
f all   and t hus so does consum pt i on of c, t ow ards abst enti on.  Conversely,  if  A 1 is above the 
steady st ate li ne,  consum pt i on and t he addi cti ve st ock i ncrease, and t he addi cti ve habi t  
persists.  We   can t hus use Fi gure 1 t o expl ore a num ber  of  drug use experi ences,  even t hose 
wh e r e the i ni t i al endow m ent   of S i s zero.  In al l  cases, the am ount  of consum pt i on capi t al 
r elati ve t o curr ent  consum pt i on wi l l   det ermi ne t he behavi our  of  t he addict  ( or  even som eone 
experi me n t i ng  wi t h  drugs).
3 B ecker and M urphy are careful  to not e that  addicti on can be benefi cial in som e ci r cum stances, how ever it  is 
onl y  harmf ul   i f   ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y  wi t h  r espect  t o  t he  stock  of  consum pt i on  i s negat i ve.  7
Fi gure 1.   A ddi cti ve  behavi our  and  t he  stock  of  consum pt i on  capit al
Ce nt r al t o t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on t heory i s the exi stence of mu l t i pl e poi nt s of
equi l i bri um ,  or unst able equil i bri um ,  and t he com pl em entari t y of consum pt i on bet w een
peri ods.   I n  Fi gure 1  t here are t wo   equi l i bri um   poi nt s,  E1  and  E2,   t he  f i r st  of  wh i ch i s unst able. 
To see w hy, consi der a user in equi l i bri um  at  E1,  wi t h curr ent consum pt i on c 1  and stock of 
consum pt i on capit al  S1.   Thi s poi nt   i s not   stable because any exogenous shock t o t he stock of 
consum pt i on capi t al wi l l  cause a perm anent  m ove ei t her t o abst enti on or t o t he hi gher 
equi l i bri um , E2.  For  exam ple, f ol l ow i ng N eri  and H eather ( 1995),  suppose t he user
experi ences a negat i ve l i f e event  ( say t he l oss of  a j ob or  di vorce)  t hat   causes S1  t o i ncrease 
( on t he assum pti on t hat   a negat i ve l i f e experi ence str engt hens t he r elati ve euphori c eff ect  of 
past   drug consum pt i ons).   Thi s i n t urn causes consum pt i on t o i ncrease along A1  and t hus,   due 
t o r einforcem ent,   t he stock f urt her  i ncreases so t hat   eventual l y t he hi gher  equi l i bri um  of  E2  i s 
r eached.  On   t he ot her  hand,   i f   t he  i ni t i al  shock  wa s   posi t i ve  ( say t he  bi r t h  of  a new   chil d),   t hen 
S1  wi l l   decrease,  causing  consum pt i on  t o  decrease and  eventual l y  t he  user  abstains  f r om   drugs 
alt oget her as the depl eti on of the st ock exceeds curr ent consum pt i on.Thi s is simi l ar to t he 
experi ence of those w ho experi me n t  wi t h drugs but  do not  becom e regul ar users. If   i ni t i al 
consum pt i on i s zero and t he stock i s l ess t han S1,   an experi me n t   wi t h drugs,   say as a r esult   of 
curi osi t y,  result s in a consum pt i on l evel that  is not  suff i cient to off set the depl eti on of the 
c(t ) =δS
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capit al  stock and so eventual l y t he i ndi vi dual   r eturns t o abstenti on.Consi deri ng E2,   i t   i s clear 
t hat  changes in t he st ock w i l l  be sm oot hed aw ay over t i me  s o  t hat  E2 rem ains a st able 
equi l i bri um .   For   exam ple,  i f   S2  we r e t o be i ncreased t hi s wi l l   i ni t i all y cause consum pt i on t o 
r i se above c 2,   m ovi ng t he user  r i ght wa r d along A1.   Ov e r   t i me   as t he depreciati on of  t he stock 
i s not  ful l y off set by consum pt i on t he st ock begi ns t o fall  and equi l i bri um  i s eventual l y 
r estored at  E2.
De s p i t e it s int ui t i ve appeal ,  t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on fr am ew ork i s li mi t ed in som e
r espects.  A  mo r e det ail ed di scussion  of  t he  ma i n  cri t i cism s of  t he  m odel   i s gi ven  l ater,   but   i t   i s 
wo r t h not i ng t hat  it  is not  clear wh a t  happens t o t he m odel ’ s predicti ons i f  som e of the 
assum pti ons  are r elaxed.  For   exam ple,  i t   coul d  be  argued  t hat   t here i s consi derable uncert ainty
about  di scount  rates. B ecker and M urphy argue t hat  poorer or less educated indi vi dual s are 
l i kel y  t o  di scount   t hei r   f ut ures heavil y  as t hey  t ake account   of  t he  f ut ure consequences  of  t hei r  
curr ent  acti ons  l ess t han  ot hers.  Ho we v e r ,   Buc k  et  al .   ( 1996)  suggest   t hat   t hese i ndi vi dual s are 
probabl y l ess cert ain about  thei r  fut ures than,  say, those fr om  m i ddl e class or we l l -educated
f am il i es. Thi s suggest s that  di scount  rates are li kel y t o be a funct i on of uncert aint y,  and as 
such m ay vary accordi ng t o l i f e changes or publ i c pol i cy aime d  a t  reduci ng uncert aint y.  
A not her area of uncert aint y i s the i ndi vi dual ’ s li f espan,  wh i ch m ay be endogenousl y
det ermi ned w i t h t he choi ce of drug consum pt i on.  Qu i t e how  uncert aint y changes t he
predicti ons of the Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  is not  clear,  alt hough i t  is an area that  requi r es 
mo r e r esearch.
2.2 Rational Addiction, Price Changes and Demand
Fi gure 1 can also be used t o i l l ust r ate the eff ect of pol i cy int ervent i ons on t he dem and for 
drugs.   Lat er,   we   provi de a det ail ed di scussion of  curr ent  pol i cy i nt ervent i ons.   I n t hi s secti on,  
how ever,   we   bri efl y consi der  t he eff ect  of  pri ces changes on t he dem and f or  drugs usi ng t he 
Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  f r am ew ork.   Suppose  t he  i ndi vi dual   i s at  poi nt   E2  on  t he  steady  state l i ne  i n 
Fi gure 2. 1,  wi t h consum pt i on c 2  and stock S2.   No w  consi der  wh a t   happens i f   t he r etail   pri ce 
( or eff ecti ve cost )  of t he addi cti ve drug fall s signi f i cantl y,  say, as a consequence of
l egali sati on.  The f all  i n pri ce causes dem and to i ncrease for every possi bl e stock of
consum pt i on,  wh i ch shif t s the dem and curve up t o A2,ceteris pari bus.  Ini t i all y,  for a given 
stock of consum pt i on,  the i ndi vi dual  wi l l  raise consum pt i on up t o t he poi nt   2 E′   on t he new  
dem and curve.   Ho we v e r ,   since  2 E′  is above t he steady state l i ne,   t he i ncrease i n consum pt i on 
mo r e than off -sets the depreciati on of the st ock,  and t hus consum pt i on grow s unt i l  the new  9
steady  state equi l i bri um   i s r eached at  E3  wi t h  t he  hi gher  consum pt i on  l evel  c 3.   Thi s i s i n stark 
cont r ast to convent i onal  thi nki ng,  wh i ch suggests that  addicts are typi call y un-responsi ve t o 
changes i n  pri ce.  B ecker  et  al .   ( 1991),   concl ude:   ‘ i f   anyt hi ng,   r ati onal   addi cts r espond  mo r e t o 
pri ce changes i n  t he  l ong  r un  t han  do  nonadi cts’  ( p.   239).
2.3 Implementing Rational Addiction Empirically
I n t he previous sect i o n  we  s a w t hat  the Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  all ow s us t o predict the 
i m pact  of  pri ce changes on consum pt i on and hence evaluat e pol i cy proposal s.  I n t hi s secti on 
w e consi der how  t he m odel  has been t ested em pir i call y.  The Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  has 
been imp l em ented in a num ber of cont exts, incl udi ng ci garett e consum pti on (Ba r dsl ey and 
Ol ekalns,   1999;   B ecker  et  al . ,   1994;   Ca me r on,   1997;   Cha l oupka,   1991;   Labeaga,  1999);   i l l i cit  
drug use (Gr ossm an and C haloupka,  1998);  alcohol  consum pt i on (Gr ossm an et al . ,   1998b;  
Wa t ers and  Sl oan,   1995);   coff ee consum pt i on  ( Ol ekalns  and  Ba r dsl ey,  1996);   and  t he  dem and 
f or cinem a (Ca me r on,  1999).  A b r i ef s u mma r y of the em pi r i cal appl i cati ons of the Rat i onal  
A ddi cti on m odel  is gi ven i n Gr ossm an et  al .   ( 1998b).   The  ma j ori t y of  t hese studi es provi de 
support i ng evi dence for rati onal  addi cti on i n t hat  they report  negat i ve and si gni f i cant pri ce 
eff ects and  posi t i ve  and  signi f i cant  past   and  f ut ure consum pt i on  eff ects.  I n  t hi s secti on we   wi l l  
f ocus on t he practi cali t i es of  i mp l em enti ng t he m odel   and consi der  t he em pir i cal  f i ndi ng l ater 
i n Secti on 2. 5  wh e n  we  l ook at  the eff ect of drug pri ces on consum pt i on.  We  w i l l  focus i n 
part i cular  on usi ng t he Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on m odel   i n t he cont ext  of  analysi ng i l l i cit   drug use,  
alt hough  i t   wa s   f i r st  used  t o  consi der  cigarett e consum pt i on  ( Cha l oupka,   1991).  
Un f ort unat ely,   due t o di f f i cult i es i n obt aini ng dat a,  t here are very f ew  studi es t hat   have 
consi dered the dem and for il l i cit  drugs i n t he cont ext of the Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel .  As  
such,  we   wi l l   concentr ate on  a uni que  study  by  Gr ossm an and  Cha l oupka  ( 1998),   t hat   f ocuses 
on  t he  pri ce elasti cit y  of  dem and  f or  cocaine.   A ssum ing  a quadrati c ut i l i t y  f unct i on  and  a r ate 
of ti me  p r eference for the present equal  to t he m arket  rate of int erest,  B ecker at  al .   ( 1994) 
show   t hat   Equat i on  ( 1)  generates a l i near  di f f erence equat i on  f or  curr ent  consum pt i on  ( t erme d  
a str uct ural  dem and  f unct i on  by  Gr ossm an and  Cha l oupka)  of  t he  f orm:
4
. 1 1 1t t t t t P c c c e q bq q + + + = + − ( 4)
4 Cha l oupka (1991) provi des an alt ernat i ve specif i cati on for t he dem and for cigarett es that  i ncl udes a
consum pt i on  stock  t erm,   generated  em pir i call y  on  t he  basi s of  observed  l i f eti me   sm oki ng  pat t erns.10
I n ( 4) ct -1  and c t +1  are past   and f ut ure consum pt i on r especti vel y ( see bel ow  f or  how  t he l att er 
i s observed),  Pt  is the curr ent pri ce of ct ,  (ot her det ermi nant s of curr ent consum pt i on are 
suppressed),b  i s t he t i me   di scount   f actor  ( equal   t o t he r eci procal  of  one pl us t he r ate of  t i me  
preference f or  t he  present,   and  assum ed t o  be  l ess t han  one)
5,q1  captures  t he  eff ect  of  pri ce  on 
dem and,  and et  is an err or term  capturi ng unobservabl e li f e-cycle experi ences that  aff ect 
consum pt i on.   The  param eter q me a s u r es the eff ect of a change in past  consum pt i on on t he 
ma r gi nal  ut i l i t y of curr ent consum pt i on,  and by sym m et r y,  the eff ect of a change in fut ure 
consum pt i on on t he m argi nal  ut i l i t y of curr ent consum pt i on.  In ot her wo r ds,  thi s param eter 
r elates to t he rei nforcem ent eff ect,  the greater the val ue of q,  the l arger is the degree of 
r einforcem ent.  Thi s specif i cati on al so em beds t he i dea of adjacent com plem entari t y,  as
changes i n  past   or  f ut ure consum pt i on  wi l l   r esult   i n  a change i n  curr ent  consum pt i on.   I n  t erms
of  t esti ng  t he  pl ausibi l i t y  of  t he  m odel ,   i f   addi cti on  i s i gnored t hen  onl y  q1  wi l l   be  signi f i cant.  
I f  how ever,  consum pt i on i s addi cti ve,  but  addi cts are m yopi c in t he sense t hat  they i gnore 
f ut ure consum pt i on,  t hen onl y q1 and coeff i cient esti ma t e for past  consum pt i on w i l l  be 
signi f i cant.   I n t he cont ext  of  t he Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on m odel   we   expect  all   t he param eters t o be 
signi f i cant  ( and  posi t i ve  except  f or  q1) .
Es t i ma t i on of (4) is relati vel y st r aight f orwa r d,  alt hough O LS est i ma t i on w i l l  result  in 
bi ased esti ma t es of t he param eters of i nt erest because the unobservabl e com ponent s that  
aff ect ut i l i t y i n each peri od w i l l  mo s t  li kel y be corr elated. Gr ossm an and C haloupka (1998) 
get  around t hi s probl em  of endogenei t y of past  and fut ure consum pt i on by est i ma t i ng t he 
dem and funct i on usi ng t wo- s t age least squares. As  s t ated, equat i on (2. 4) imp l i es that  c t  is 
i ndependent   of  past   and f ut ure pri ces,  t hei r   eff ect  onl y com ing i ndi r ectl y t hrough changes i n 
past  or fut ure consum pt i on.  Thus,  provi ded t he unobservabl e com ponent s are uncorr elated 
wi t h  pri ces,  past   and  f ut ure pri ces can be  used  as i nst r um ent s f or  past   and f ut ure consum pt i on,  
r especti vel y.
The  l ast  em pir i cal  i ssue t o consi der  concerns dat a and a consi derable proport i on of  t he 
Gr ossm an and C haloupka paper is dedi cated to a l engt hy di scussion of how  t hey generated 
dat a appropri ate f or  esti ma t i ng t he m odel .   Gr ossm an and Cha l oupka use panel   dat a f r om  t he 
Un i versit y of Mi chigan’s M oni t ori ng t he Fut ure research program . Da t a on a representati ve 
sam ple of bet w een 15,000 and 19, 000 hi gh school  seniors have been col l ected for t hi s 
program  every year  since 1975 ( see Johnst on et   al .   ( 1995)  f or  mo r e det ail s).   I nt ervi ew ees are 
asked about   t hei r   use of  ma r i j uana ( cannabi s)  and a num ber  of  ot her  com m onl y abused drugs 
5  No t e  t hat   i f   i ndi vi dual s are  t ot all y  m yopi c t hen  b  =  0  and  t he  t erm  i n  f ut ure  consum pt i on  di sappears.11
i ncl udi ng cocaine,  and fol l ow-up surveys are carr i ed out  peri odi call y (provi di ng up t o fi ve 
observat i ons on each i ndi vi dual   i n t he dat a used by Gr ossm an and Cha l oupka).   Thi s peri odi c 
r eview  eff ecti vel y provi des i nforma t i on on past ,   curr ent  and f ut ure consum pt i on by all ow i ng 
t he l ags and leads of the m i ddl e observat i on t o coi nci de w i t h past  and fut ure consum pt i on,  
r especti vel y.   Pr i ce i nforma t i on i s t aken f r om  t he Syst em  t o Re t r i eve I nforma t i on f r om  Dr ug 
Evi dence ( STRI DE) ,   wh i ch i s ma i nt ained by t he US  Dr ug Enf orcem ent  Ad mi ni str ati on ( see 
Ca ul ki ns (1995a) or Di Na r do (1993) for mo r e detail s).  Gr ossm an and C haloupka focus on 
cocaine i n t hei r   study and proceed t o esti ma t e t he f ul l   cost  of  cocaine by geographi c l ocati on 
over ti me .
6  Ag a i n,   as wi t h consum pt i on,   l ags and l eads are used t o create past   and f ut ure r eal 
cocaine  pri ces,  and  simi l ar  m easures are used  f or  t i me - v a r yi ng socio-econom i c vari ables.
The  r esult s of  Gr ossm an and Cha l oupka’s study provi de broad support   f or  t he Ra t i onal  
A ddi cti on m odel .  The authors present num erous est i ma t es corr espondi ng t o t he t echni que 
used (OLS o r  t wo- s t age least squares),  t he vari ous m easures of drug use,  i ncl udi ng
part i cipat i on,  and w het her t i me - v a r yi ng soci o-econom i c vari ables are incl uded i n t he
str uct ural  dem and  equat i on  and  past   and f ut ure val ues  of  t hese  vari ables i ncl uded  i n  t he  set  of 
i nst r um ent s. Re ga r dl ess of how  t he m odel  is specif i ed, the est i ma t ed coeff i cient of fut ure 
consum pt i on i s alw ays posi t i ve and st ati sti call y si gni f i cant,  and t he coeff i cient on past
consum pt i on i s m o stl y posi t i ve and signi f i cant.   The  esti ma t es f or  past   consum pt i on are onl y 
at odds w i t h t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  w hen pot enti all y endogenous soci o-econom i c
vari ables are excluded f r om  t he t wo- s t age l east  squares esti ma t es,  and t hi s i s possibl y due t o 
t he  i mp r ecision  i nt r oduced  by  r educi ng  t he  set  of  i nst r um ent s.  I n  t erms   of  t he  di scount   f actor,  
b,   wh i ch i s calculated as t he  r ati o  of  t he  coeff i cient  of  f ut ure consum pt i on  t o  t he  coeff i cient  of 
past   consum pt i on,   t he r esult s are l ess i mp r essive.   The  esti ma t ed di scount   r ates corr espond t o 
i nt erest  r ates i n  t he  r ange  of  –3%   t o  4%   ( di scount   f actors r angi ng  f r om   1. 03  t o  0. 98).   Ca me r on 
( 1999)  i s hi ghl y cri t i cal  of  t he di scount   r ates f ound i n appl i ed wo r k,   singl i ng out   t he di scount  
r ates presented i n  B ecker  et  al .   ( 1994)  t hat   i mp l y  i nt erest  r ates r angi ng  f r om   56. 3%   t o  222. 6%  
( alt hough  Ca me r on  actual l y  f i nds  qui t e pl ausibl e di scount   r ates i n  hi s study  of  t he  dem and  f or 
cinem a).   Wh e t her  or  not   t hi s i s a w eakness i n t hi s appl i ed wo r k i s open t o debat e.  Ho we v e r ,  
Gr ossm an and  Cha l oupka  concl ude  t hat :
…  These r esult s,  com bined  wi t h  t he  det ail ed analysi s i n  B ecker et  al .   (1994)  and 
i n G rossm an et al .  (1998) suggest  t hat  dat a on cocaine,  cigarett e, or alcohol  
6 The actual  process of generati ng t he appropri ate pri ce seri es is very det ail ed and invol ves num erous st eps to 
t ake  account   of  puri t y,   l ocati on,   etc.  For   mo r e  det ail s see  Gr ossm an and  Cha l oupka  ( 1998).12
consum pt i on m ay not  be ri ch enough t o pi n dow n t he di scount  factor wi t h 
precision,   even  i f   t he  r ati onal   addi cti on  m odel   i s accepted.
( Gr ossm an and  Cha l oupka,   1998,   p.   448).
Fi nal l y,  in t erms  o f  pri ce elasti cit i es, Gr ossm an and C haloupka report  esti ma t es that  
suggest   t hat   drug users are l i kel y t o be sensit i ve t o pri ce changes,  a r esult   wh i ch i s consi stent 
wi t h t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel .  They f i nd a l ong-run pri ce elasti cit y of dem and for 
cocaine  of –1. 35 and a sm al l er short -run elasti cit y of –0. 96.  Thi s is also consi stent wi t h t he 
Ra t i onal  A ddi cti on m odel .  As  we  d i scussed in t he previous sect i on,  the m odel  predicts that  
t he i ni t i al reacti on t o a pri ce change is represented by a m ove t o a di f f erent dem and curve 
( f r om  A1  t o  A2  i n Fi gure 2. 1 i n t he case of  a pri ce drop),   f ol l ow ed by a m ovem ent   along t he 
new   curve  t o  t he  stable steady  state equi l i bri um   ( poi nt   E3  i n  Fi gure 1).  
2.4 Beyond Rational Addiction
Al t hough t here have been a num ber of report edly successful  att em pts to i mp l em ent t he 
Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel   em pir i call y  ( alt hough  r arely  i n  t he  cont ext  of  i l l i cit   drug use  due  t o 
l ack of appropri ate data),  t he m odel  i t self  att r acts m any cri t i cs, albei t  f r om  m ai nl y non-
econom i sts.  I n t hi s secti on we   bri efl y consi der  som e of  t he cri t i cism s t hat   have been l evell ed 
at  t he m odel   and me n t i on som e of  t he extensions t o t he mo d e l   t hat   have been proposed.
7  We  
do not  focus on t he fundam ent al debat e betw een proponent s of the rati onal  choi ce view  of 
addi cti on and t hose t hat  consi der addi cts to be t ot all y m yopi c w it h t i m e-inconsi stent
preferences and only i nt erested in i mme d i ate grati f i cati on (see M ochri e, 1996;  O’ D onoghue 
and Rabi n,  1999,  2000).  Ra t her,  we  wi l l  focus on cri t i cism s and extensions t o t he Rat i onal  
A ddi cti on  m odel   t hat   are based  on  econom i c r ather  t han  behavi oural  science consi derati ons.
On e   cri t i cism  of  t he  Ra t i onal   Add i cti on  m odel   i s t hat   i t   t akes no  account   of  i ndi vi dual s’ 
r egret  about   t hei r   addi cti ve consum pt i on.   Cr i t i cs claim  t hat   i t   i s unreasonabl e t o assum e t hat  
addi cts choose t o ri sk addicti on i n t he know l edge that  i t  presents pot enti al f ut ure harm
( t ypi call y t he non-rati onal  approach assum es that  addi cti on ari ses fr om  a com pul sive act 
carr i ed out   wi t hout   any  consi derati on  of  t he  f ut ure).   Or phani des  and  Zer vos  ( 1995)  att em pt  t o 
overcom e t hi s probl em  by i ncorporati ng t he process of  l earni ng and r egret  i nt o t he Ra t i onal
7  M odi f i cati ons  of  t he  m odel   t hat   are  specif i c  t o  cert ain  goods  are  not   consi dered  here.  For   exam ple,  Sur anovi c  et
al .  (1999),  and i n response,  Jones (1999),  have devel oped m odel s of cigarett e addicti on t hat  are based on t he 
Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel   but   r eint erpret  som e of  t he  assum pti ons  t o  i ncorporate  t he  adjust me n t   cost  approach  t o 
addi cti on.13
A ddi cti on  m odel .   The  basi c prem ise i s t hat   i ndi vi dual s do  not   know   t hei r   addi cti ve  t endenci es 
unt i l   t hey have actual l y experi me n t ed wi t h t he pot enti all y addi cti ve good ( l earni ng),   but   t hat  
f or som e indi vi dual s thi s experi me n t ati on al t ers the st ock of consum pt i on capi t al such that  
t hey  eventual l y  f ol l ow   an addi cti ve  pat h.   Ha d   t hese  i ndi vi dual s know n  t hi s addi cti ve  out com e 
before t hey start ed experi me n t i ng ( i . e.  t hey had accurately f ormu l ated t hei r   pri or  probabi l i t y 
of  addi cti on  before experi me n t i ng)  t hen  t hey  w oul d  probabl y  not   have  start ed i n  t he  f i r st  pl ace 
( r egret) .   Thi s i nvol ves  separati ng  t he  i ndi vi dual ’ s ut i l i t y  f unct i on  i nt o  t wo   part s:
) ] . ( ) , ( [ ) ] ( ) , ( [ ) (t S t c v t c t y u t u t qx + = ( 5)
He r e, the fi r st term,   ) ] ( ) , ( [ t c t y u ,  is the posi t i ve i m pact of consum pt i on of bot h goods on 
ut i l i t y w hi l st the second t erm,   ) ] ( ) , ( [ t S t c v ,  represents the possi bl e detr i me n t al eff ects fr om  
past  consum pt i on of t he addi cti ve good.  These eff ects occur wi t h probabi l i t y xt ,  wh i ch 
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The  param eter  q  i s i ni t i all y  unknow n,   and  r epresents t he  addi cti ve  t endenci es of  t he  i ndi vi dual  
t hat  vary bet w een 0 (non-addi ct)  and 1 (pot enti al addi ct) .  Thi s param eter is updat ed by t he 
i ndi vi dual on observi ng t he aff ect on ut i l i t y subsequent  t o consum pt i on.  O n cont i nui ng 
consum pt i on,   S( t )   i s i ncreased unt i l   addi cti on occurs,  wh i ch can be before t he t r ue val ue of q
i s r ecogni sed.
Thi s extension of  t he Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on m odel   yi elds a m odi f i ed version  of  t he  dem and 
curve show n earl i er  i n Fi gure 1.   I n eff ect,   t he m odi f i ed dem and curve i s spli t   at  som e cri t i cal 
val ue  of  t he  consum pt i on  stock,   wi t h  t he  curve  mu c h   hi gher  aft er  t hi s cri t i cal  poi nt   ( t he  m odel  
sti l l   r etains t wo   equi l i bri um  poi nt s,  one on t he l ow er  port i on and one on t he hi gher  port i on of 
t he dem and curve).   Pr ovi ded t he consum pt i on stock r em ains bel ow  t hi s cri t i cal  l evel  t hen t he 
opt i ma l  pat h al wa y s  l eads eventual l y t o abst enti on.  Ho we v e r ,  if  an indi vi dual  bui l ds up a 
stock greater than t hi s cri t i cal level before reali sing hi s or her tr ue probabi l i t y of addi cti on,  
t hen t he i ndi vi dual   wi l l   be draw n i nt o a harmf ul   addi cti on.   Thi s m odi f i cati on of  t he Ra t i onal  
A ddi cti on m odel  is valuabl e as it  hel ps expl ain som e behavi our that  w oul d ot herwi se be 
consi dered as com pletely  i r r ati onal :14
…  We   show   t hat   t he  bul k  of  t he  obj ecti ons  concerni ng  earl i er  r ati onal   m odel s can 
be at t r i but ed not  to rati onal  decision m aki ng,  but  rather to t he com m on i mp l i cit  
assum pti on of  perf ect  f oresight .   The  essenti al  f eature l acking  f r om   t hese  m odel s i s 
t he recogni t i on t hat  inexperi enced indi vi dual s are ini t i all y uncert ain of the exact 
pot enti al harm  associated w it h consum i ng an addi cti ve good.  O nce uncert aint y 
and  a process of  l earni ng  t hrough  experi me n t ati on  are i ncorporated int o t he earl i er 
r ati onal  fr am ew ork,  the process of rati onal l y get t i ng “hooked” i nt o an addi cti on 
becom es evident ,  and our underst andi ng of t he det erm inant s of addi cti on i s 
subst anti all y  i mp r oved.
( Or phani des  and  Zer vos,   1995,   p.   740).
The i nt egrati on of  learni ng and regret int o t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  represents a 
subt l e m odi f i cati on of  t he basi c m odel   t hat   appears t o count er  t he argum ent s put   f orwa r d by 
cri t i cs w ho claim t hat  t he rati onal  f r am ew ork cannot  expl ain i ni t i ati on i nt o addi cti on.
Ho we v e r ,   a mo r e f undam ent al  cri t i cism  of  t he m odel   concerns i t s assum pti on t hat   i ndi vi dual  
r ate of  t i me   preferences are f i xed and t i m e-consi stent.
8  I f   t he r ate of  t i me   preference i s f i xed,  
t hi s m eans t hat   t here i s a const ant  t r ade-off   bet w een t he pl easure of  curr ent   consum pt i on and 
f ut ure ut i l i t y,   wh i ch w oul d  i mp l y  t hat   t here i s no  di f f erence bet w een t he  wa y   addi cts and  non-
addi cts l ook t o t he f ut ure.  Un f ort unat ely t hi s i s i ncom pat i bl e wi t h t he observed behavi our  of 
addi cts t hat   appears t o suggest   t hat   t hey f ocus on i mme d i ate grati f i cati on wi t hout   concern f or 
t he  f ut ure.  I n  r esponse  t o  t hi s cri t i cism ,  Or phani des  and  Zer vos  ( 1998)  present  an extension  t o 
t he basi c m odel   t hat   appears t o r econci l e t hi s probl em .  They  r eject  t he non-rati onal   approach 
t hat   has m yopi a as t he  cause of  addi cti on,   and  r etain  t he  i dea of  ut i l i t y  ma x i mi sati on.   The  key 
t o  t hei r   extension  of  t he  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel   i s t o  all ow   t he  r ate of  t i me   preference t o  be 
det ermi ned endogenousl y.  Thus,  increases in past  consum pt i on of the addi cti ve good  w i l l
have a posi t i ve i m pact on t he i ndi vi dual ’ s rate of ti me  p r eference and induce a form o f  
m yopi a. In t hi s cont ext,  t he i ni t i ati on i nt o addi cti on i ncreases the desi r abil i t y of curr ent 
consum pt i on  and  t hus  i ncreases t he  r einforcem ent  eff ect.   Thi s extension  r etains  t he  propert i es 
of  t he basi c m odel :   mu l t i pl e steady states corr espondi ng t o hi gh consum pt i on and abstenti on,  
and t he pot enti al  f or  cycles of  addi cti on ( f r om  experi me n t ati on,   t o bi nges,   t o wi t hdraw al,   t o 
8  Ther e i s also som e debat e i n  t he  l i t erature about   wh e t her  we   can actual l y  know   wh a t   addi cts’  preferences l ook 
l i ke.  In t hi s respect,  Fehr  and Zych (1998) present the result s of an experi me n t al study i n w hi ch addicti ve 
preferences we r e i nduced.   The  authors suggest   t hat   addi cts appear  t o  consum e  t oo  mu c h   i n  com pari son  wi t h  t he 
opt i ma l   consum pt i on  pat h  i mp l i ed  by  t he  r ati onal   addi cti on  f r am ew ork.15
abstenti on,   and  t o  r eoccurr ence).   Ul t i ma t ely,  t he  eff ect  of  all ow i ng  t he  r ate of  t i me   preference 
t o be aff ected by addi cti ve behavi our  i s t hat   m yopi c behavi our  i s a consequence of  addi cti on,  
r ather  t han  i t s cause ( as i s t he  case of  t he  non-rati onal   approach).
Thi s area has also been considered em pi r i call y.  In a uni que st udy,  Br ett evil l e-Jensen
( 1999) has expl ored em pir i call y t he assum pti on of stable rate of ti me  p r eferences, wh i ch 
r equi r es that  alt hough drug users and non-users shoul d exhi bi t  di f f erences in t hei r  di scount  
r ates,  curr ent  users and ex-users shoul d not .   The  di f f erences bet w een non-users and users is 
t hat   t he l att er  wi l l   have a hi gher  r ate of  t i me   preference and t hus heavil y di scount   t he f ut ure 
adverse consequences of thei r  consum pt i on i n favour of curr ent grati f i cati on.  Ho we v e r ,  the 
di sti nct i on bet w een users and ex-users shoul d not   be due t o di f f erences i n t he di scount   r ate. 
As  a l r eady di scussed, i n t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  preferences for an indi vi dual  are 
assum ed const ant,  and i ndi vi dual s onl y change bet w een drug use and non-use w hen curr ent 
consum pt i on fall s below  t he unst able steady st ate. Thi s leads to a decli ne i n t he addi cti ve 
stock,   and hence f urt her  r educt i ons i n t he next   peri od l evel  of  consum pt i on,   unt i l   absti nence 
occurs. Cont r ary t o t hi s, Br ett evil l e-Jensen show s t hat  t here is an observabl e dif f erence 
bet w een t he  t i me   preference r ates of  curr ent  and  f orme r   addi cts.
The Br ett evil l e-Jensen study uses dat a coll ected fr om  heroi n addi cts, non-users and 
f orme r   users i n Os l o.   To  t est  i ndi vi dual s’  r ate of  t i me   preference,  t he part i cipant s i n t he Os l o 
study  we r e asked  f or  how   mu c h   t hey  w oul d  sell   a wi nni ng  l ot t ery  t i cket  f or  i f   t he  pri ze m oney 
we r e not   t o be pai d out   unt i l   eit her  one w eek l ater  or  one year  l ater.   A  com pari son of  t he t wo  
sell i ng pri ces then provi des an esti ma t e of the i ndi vi dual ’ s discount  rate. A ddi t i onal  checks 
we r e m ade to see w hether the part i cular fi nanci al cir cum stances of drug users aff ected ti me  
preference.  I n  t hi s case,  t he  part i cipant s we r e asked  t o  choose  a me t hod  of  paym ent   t hat   eit her 
em phasi sed earl y  paym ent   or  a paym ent   t hat   wa s   spread out ,   wi t h  t he  f orme r   havi ng  a sm all er 
present  val ue.   Al t hough t he sam ple used i n t he study wa s   sm all   ( 50 ex-users
9,   110 non-users
and 110 addi cts),   Br ett evil l e-Jensen f ound a signi f i cant  di f f erence bet w een t he di scount   r at es
of  curr ent  and  ex-users,  and  bet w een users and  non-users.  The  second  r esult   i s consi stent  wi t h 
t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel ,  but  t he forme r  i s not .
10 Thi s is probl em  for t he Rat i onal
A ddi cti on  m odel   as i t   em phasi ses t hat   i ndi vi dual   di f f erences i n  di scount  r ates can hel p  explain 
addi cti on,  but  as preferences are assum ed stable, tr ansit i ons bet w een addicti on and non-use
9 An  e x  u s e r  is defi ned as som eone w ho had previousl y been a long- t erm  abuser  of  heroi n or  am phet am ines,  
alt hough  no  i nforma t i on  i s gi ven  on  how   l ong  t hey  l ast  used  t he  drug.  
10 Al t hough you coul d argue t hat  ex-users are just  anot her self - selected group w ho on average have di f f erent 
(fixed)  di scount   rates.16
are a consequence of  t he change i n addi cti ve stock onl y.   Br ett evil l e-Jensen suggest s t hat   t he 
assum pti on of stable preferences does not  hol d and t hat  it  is qui t e li kel y t hat  rate of ti me  
preferences are actual l y endogenousl y det ermi ned.  The m odi f i cati on t o t he Rat i onal
A ddi cti on m odel  presented by O rphani des and Zervos (1998) does appear to address thi s 
probl em  and suggest   t hat   f ut ure i mp l em entati ons  of  t he  m odel   shoul d  t ake t hi s i nt o  account .  
W e have seen t hat  a num ber of cri t i cism s and extensions of the Rat i onal  A ddi cti on 
m odel  have been put  forwa r d si nce the publ i cati on of the t heory.  It  is easy to di sm iss the 
m odel  based on casual  observat i on of addi cti ve behavi our:  com m on sense suggest s that  
addi cts are not   r ati onal .   Ho we v e r ,   t he  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel   simp l y  uses  a r ati onal   choi ce 
f r am ew ork t o descri be and predict the acti ons of addi cts. To t hi s extent it  appears to w ork 
r ather we l l .   The  m odel   predicts t hat   f ew  peopl e wi l l   be part i all y addi cted,  t hey eit her  abstain 
or  consum e r egul arl y;   i t   show s t hat   addi cts are l i kel y t o r espond t o pri ce changes part i cularl y 
i n t he l ong-run,   and f i nal l y,   t he m odel   does provi de an expl anati on of  cycles of  addi cti on and 
absti nence based on t he r esponse of  i ndi vi dual s t o exogenous events ( Mo c h r i e,  1996).
11  We  
have  also seen t hat   wi t h  som e mi nor  m odi f i cati ons,   t he  basi c r ati onal   addi cti on  m odel   r em ains 
r obust  to t he cri t i cism s of those advocat i ng non-rati onal  approaches. Empi r i call y t here is a 
l ack of evidence i n ei t her di r ecti on,  but  thi s is understandabl e given t he pauci t y of dat a. 
Ho we v e r ,  it  is qui t e evident  that  despi t e som e unansw ered quest i ons about  uncert aint y and 
endogenous l i f eti me s ,   t he Ra t i onal  A ddi cti on m odel   r epresents a ma j or  advance i n econom i c 
t heory t ow ards understandi ng t he probl em  of  addi cti ve drug use,   wh i ch all ow s pol i cy ma k e r s 
t o  generate predicti ons  concerni ng  observabl e acti ons.  
3. The Welfare Economics of Drug Prohibition
I n t he previous sect i on w e consi dered the econom i cs of addi cti on and how  t he Rat i onal
A ddi cti on m odel   provi des an econom i c f r am ew ork f or  t hi nki ng about   addi cti ve behavi our.   I n 
t hi s secti on  we   t urn  our  att enti on  t o  we l f are econom i cs.  The  basi c i ssue here i s wh e t her  or  not  
drug use i m poses we l f are l osses on i ndi vi dual   consum ers and society as a w hol e.    I n simp l e 
t erms ,  any resources used to enforce drug pol i cy incur an opport uni t y cost  that  has t o be 
bal anced w it h t he benefi t s deri ved fr om  a drug enforcem ent program . The  benefi t s of  drug 
pol i cies are t he r esult i ng r educt i ons i n t he social  costs t hat   we r e bei ng i m posed by drug users 
11  I t   shoul d  be  not ed  t hat   Mo c h r i e  ( 1996)  i s not   a  support er  of  t he  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel ,   r ather  he  r efut es  t he 
w hol e econom i c me t hodol ogy  t hat   underpi ns  r ati onal   choi ce m odel s and  presents an alt ernat i ve  m odel   grounded 
i n  behavi oural  psychol ogy.  17
on  t hi r d  part i es.    These external   costs,  wh i ch mi ght   i ncl ude  an i ncreased burden  on  a publ i cly 
provi ded healt h care system  or  t he i m pact  of   acqui sit i ve cri me ,   create a di vergence bet w een 
t he ma r gi nal   pri vat e costs of  t he i ndi vi dual   decision ma k e r   ( t he drug user)   and t he ma r gi nal  
social costs borne by soci ety as a w hol e. The wel f are econom i cs fr am ew ork i s depi cted 
simp l y  i n  Fi gure 2.
Fi gure2.The  social  costs of  i l l i cit   drug  use
I n Fi gure 2,   we   assum e i ndi vi dual s have a dow nw ard slopi ng dem and curve f or  drugs 
( MP B ) ,  and face a constant pri vat e m argi nal  cost (MP C ) ,  alt hough a vari able cost funct i on 
l eads t o t he sam e concl usi ons.   The  ma r gi nal   pri vat e cost  r efl ects t he eff ecti ve costs f aced by 
t he i ndi vi dual   drug t aker  ( i ncl udi ng t he r i sk of  t r ading i n t he i l l egal  drugs ma r ket ) ,   wh i ch he 
or  she wi l l   equat e wi t h t he pri vat e benefi t s of  consum pt i on t o yi eld an opt i ma l   consum pt i on 
l evel   at  q 1.   Fr om  t he poi nt   of  vi ew  of  society,   t he consum pt i on of  i l l i cit   drugs generates t he 
previousl y m ent i oned ext ernal  costs, wh i ch are represented by t he m argi nal  external  cost 
curve  ( ME C ) .   These are t he  costs of  drug  use  t hat   are not   t aken i nt o  account  by  t he  i ndi vi dual  
i n m aki ng t he pri vat ely opt i ma l  consum pt i on choi ce q1.  A ddi ng t he pri vat e costs and t he 
social costs toget her we  g e t  the t ot al social costs of drug use,  represented by t he m argi nal  
social cost curve (MS C ) .  Fr om  t he poi nt  of vi ew  of society,  the al l ocati on of resources 
r esult i ng  f r om   t he  pri vat e choi ce of  q1  i s Par eto  i neff i cient.   The  eff i cient  l evel  of  consum pt i on 
wi l l   be at  q 2  wh e r e,  assum ing t hat   t here are no benefi t s t o t he r est  of  society f r om  i ndi vi dual  
q2 q1 Qu a n t i t y  of  drugs






drug use,   t he social  costs of  drug use are equat ed wi t h t he benefi t s ( at  every poi nt   bet w een q 2
and  q1  t he  t ot al  costs of  drug  use  are greater  t han  t he  benefi t s).   I n  t hi s sense,  eff i ciency can be 
i mp r oved  by  governm ent   i nt ervent i on  t hat   r educes consum pt i on  f r om   q1  t o  q2  ( not e t hat   i f   t he 
external  costs are big enough,  q2 wi l l  corr espond t o t he ori gi n,  that  is, zero consum pt i on or 
absolut e prohi bi t i on).  
Ho we v e r ,   gi ven t hi s simp l e f r am ew ork,   i t   i s di f f i cult   t o f i nd a convi nci ng case f or  drug 
prohi bi t i on  i n  t he  l i t erature of  we l f are econom i cs.  On   t he  cont r ary,   econom i sts are mo r e l i kel y 
t o argue t hat  t he ext ernal i t i es and m eri t  goods (pat ernal i sti c) f r am ew orks of we l f are
econom i cs are simp l y i nadequat e as a m eans for expl aini ng t he prohi bi t i on of drug
consum pt i on.  Cul yer ( 1973) suggest s six pri nci pal  proposi t i ons upon w hi ch prohi bi t i on
argum ent s shoul d  be  based.   These i ncl ude:
•  one i ndi vi dual ’ s use of  drugs i m poses costs on ot hers i n society,   eit her  t hrough anti -
social  behavi our  or  acqui sit i ve  cri me ;
•  drug users im pose an addi t i onal  burden on a publ i cly provi ded heal t h servi ce eit her 
t hrough  t r eatme n t   or  r ehabil i t ati on;
•  Soci ety  simp l y  f i nds  t he  use  of  drugs  undesi r able;
•  drug  users shoul d  be  prot ected as t hey  do  not   act  i n  t hei r   ow n  best   i nt erests;
•  an indi vi dual ’ s choi ce to consum e drugs m ay l ead to an escalati on i n soci ety of an 
undesi r ed acti vi t y;
•  drug  users are l ess product i ve  me mb e r s of  society.
These proposi t i ons  encapsulate t he  external i t i es and  me r i t   goods  f r am ew orks  of  we l f are 
econom i cs and m any econom i sts subsequent  to Cul yer have revisit ed them  i n one form o r  
anot her  f or  f urt her  i nvest i gat i on  ( see f or  exam ple,  Bl ock,   1996;   Li t t l echil d  &  Wi sem an,  1988;  
Mi r on &  Zw i ebel,  1995;  St evenson, 1994a;  Wa g s t aff  &  M aynard,  1988).  Typi call y t hese 
authors have al l  put  f orwa r d convi nci ng argum ent s to suggest  t hat  due t o i nforma t i on
probl em s and  som e f undam ent al  f l aw s i n  t hese  proposi t i ons,   we l f are econom i cs i s unl i kel y  t o 
predict the gai ns of prohi bi t i on over legali sati on.  It  is w ort h consi deri ng som e of the m ore 
cont enti ous proposi t i ons i n great er det ail ,  alt hough t he ai m o f  t hi s secti on i s not  t o t est 
prohi bi t i on-l egali sati on i ssues, rather it  is to consi der how  w el f are econom i cs can inform t he 
debat e.19
3.1 Drugs and Crime
Of   all   t he proposi t i ons,   t he f i r st,   t hat   drug users i m pose costs upon ot hers ( and hence cause a 
di vergence bet w een pri vat e and social  costs)  i s perhaps t he mo s t   wi del y cit ed and debat ed i n 
t he l i t erature.  Ther e i s consi derable evidence t o i ndi cate a corr elati on bet w een drug use and 
i ncom e-generati ng cri me   ( see Coi d et  al .  (2000) for a  s u mma r y of recent UK e v i dence and 
Bennet t  (1991) for a review  of the non-econom i cs li t erature on t he l i nk bet w een drugs and 
cri me ) .   For   exam ple,  usi ng dat a f r om  Fl ori da’s 76 count i es f or  1986 and 1987,   Benson et   al .
( 1992) found a si gni f i cant corr el ati on bet w een the si ze of a drug m arket  and t he l evel of 
propert y cri me .  Mo r e recentl y,  uri ne-anal ysi s on a sam ple of 506 arr estees in Engl and and 
Wa l es has been used to st udy t he l i nk bet w een cri m e and drugs (Bennet t ,  2000).
12 Thi s 
r esearch, carr i ed out  through t he N ew  Engl i sh and W el sh A rr estee D rug A buse M oni t ori ng 
( NEW - ADAM)  progra mme ,  found t hat  almo s t  70%  of the arr estees that  we r e eventual l y 
selected for analysi s tested posi t i ve for at least one drug,  excludi ng al cohol.  In addi t i on,  
average expendi t ure by arr estees t esti ng posi t i ve f or  drugs wa s   £129 per  w eek,  averaged over 
t he  past   12  m ont hs.   I n  t erms   of  cri me ,   t he  r eport   suggest s t hat :
…T h e   r esult s have  show n  t hat   drug  users have  hi gher  l evels of  i l l egal  i ncom e  and 
hi gher  r ates of  self -report ed crime  t han  non  users.   The  result s also have  show n  a 
str ong  corr elati on  bet w een a wi de  r ange  of  me a s u r es of  drug  use  and  a wi de  r ange 
of m easures of cri me .  Al mo s t  hal f  of arr estees beli eve that  there is a connecti on 
bet w een thei r  ow n drug use and off endi ng.  The r esearch fi ndi ngs so far suggest  
t hat  drug use (especiall y heroi n and crack/cocaine use) is associated w it h hi gher 
l evels of bot h prevalence (t he proport i on of t he popul ati on i nvol ved) and
i nci dence  ( t he  r ate  of  off endi ng  of  t hose  i nvol ved)  of  off endi ng.
( Bennet t ,   2000,   p.   85).
Ther e i s perhaps l i t t l e doubt   t hat   t here i s som e corr elati on bet w een drug use and cri me .  
Ho we v e r ,   t here i s very  l i t t l e evidence  t o  support   any  not i on  of  causali t y  bet w een drug  use  and 
cri me   ( or  vice versa).   Benson et   al .   ( 1992)  concl ude t hat   i t   i s t he i l l egali t y of  drugs use t hat  
can lead to cri me ,  not  the drug use i t self .  In ot her wo r ds,  rather than t here being a psycho-
12 I t  is w ort h not i ng t hat  the sam pl e of 506 arr estees used in t he N EW - ADAM r e s e a r c h  i s derived from  an 
avail able popul ati on  of  2971  arr estees t hat   passed  t hrough  t he  custody  bl ocks  i n  t he  f our  pol i ce stati ons  studi ed
over  a 30-day  peri od.   Thi s r epresents a l oss of  83% ,   over  hal f   of  wh i ch wa s   due  t o  t he  short   stay of  t he  arr estee 
at the pol i ce stati on t hat  m eant that  the i nt ervi ew er had i nsuff i cient ti me  t o m ake cont act.  Thi s in i t self  raises 
som e doubt s about   t he  representati ve  nat ure  of  t he  sam ple.20
pharm acologi cal expl anati on of t he corr elati on bet w een drug use and cri me  ( e.g.  “m ost 
burgl ars are on drugs”),   i t   i s mo r e l i kel y t hat   i t   can be expl ained by a f i nanci ng-consum pt i on
expl anati on.  In t hi s cont ext,  m any aut hors in addi t i on t o Benson et  al  have quest i oned t he 
supposed  l i nk  bet w een drug  use  and  cri me .   I n  a system ati c r eview  of  t he  costs and  benefi t s of 
drug prohi bi t i on,   Mi r on and Zwi ebel  ( 1995)  concl ude t hat   as drugs pri ces are t ypi call y r aised 
as a r esult   of  prohi bi t i on,   i t   i s prohi bi t i on i t self   t hat   i s t he pri ma r y cause of  cri me   associated 
wi t h  drug  use.   Thi s poi nt   i s str ongl y  r einforced by  St evenson ( 1994a):
…  Al l   l egal  system s off er  econom i c,  social,   pol i t i cal  and  me d i cal  advant age over 
prohi bi t i on.     The  econom i c  case  f or  l egali sati on  i s part i cularl y  str ong.     C heap  l egal 
drugs w i l l  reduce the ext ernal  costs of drug use w hi ch are found i n acqui sit i ve
( som eti me s   vi ol ent)   cri me   and  r i sks t o  publ i c  healt h.   ( St evenson,  1994a,   p.   68).
I ndeed,  Cul yer  ( 1973)  concl udes:  
…  On e   i mme d i ate possibi l i t y t hat   ma y   we l l   be l ess costl y t han any ot her  me t hod 
i n reduci ng t he cri m e associated w it h drug abuse w oul d be  t o l egali se drug 
t r aff i cking!.
( Cul yer,   1973,   p.   452).
That   drugs  pol i cies ma y   be  t he  ‘ cause’  of  cri me   due  t o  drug  users’  di f f i cult i es i n  l egall y 
f i nanci ng t hei r   habi t   presents a probl em  f or  t he we l f are econom i cs f r am ew ork.   The  external  
cost of cri me  i s onl y relevant if  the cri me  i s a dir ect result  of the drug use,  and not  as a 
consequence of i nt ervent i ons desi gned t o t ackle drug use.  Un f ort unat ely,  i t  i s som ew hat 
di f f i cult  to prove t he fi nanci ng-consum pt i on expl anati on em pi r i call y gi ven t hat  there have 
been f ew  i nst ances,  i f   any,   i n wh i ch t he sam e cohort   of  drug users has experi enced l egal  and 
i l l egal  drugs ma r ket s.  A not her  di f f i cult y wi t h t hi s hypot hesi s i s wi t h r egards t o t he i m pact  of 
enforcem ent pol i cies upon pri ce. The argum ent s discussed above assum e (understandabl y) 
t hat  drug pri ces are higher in t he prohi bi t ed m arket  than t hey w oul d be i n a l egal ma r ket .  
Ho we v e r ,   t hi s i s anot her  area of  debat e ( see l ater)   i n wh i ch t here are f ew  em pir i cal  r esult s t o 
provi de  gui dance.  
3.2 Increased burden on publicly provided health care
I t  w oul d seem  appropri ate that  i f  a society col l ecti vel y pays for healt h care so that  t he 
ma r gi nal   cost  t o t he pat i ent  i s ( eff ecti vel y)  zero,   t hen t he state has a l egit i ma t e i nt erest  i n t he 21
healt h of every i ndi vi dual  i n t hat  society. Thi s suggests that  wh e r e an indi vi dual ’ s
consum pt i on  choi ces are i m posi ng  an addi t i onal   burden  on  publ i cly  provi ded  healt h  care t hen 
t hat   acti vi t y shoul d be di scouraged.  Such  i s t he case wi t h drug consum pt i on i f   we   accept  t hat  
t here are cert ain heal t h ri sks associated w it h t hat  choi ce (alt hough i t  is by no m eans cert ain 
t hat   t hi s i s t he  case wi t h  all   drugs  and/ or  i ndi vi dual s).  
Wi t h  r espect  t o  em pir i cal  wo r k  i n  t he  area of  i ncreased burdens  upon  healt h  care,  M odel  
( 1993) presents an analysi s of a rather fort unat e experi me n t  in t he U S.  Be t w een 1973 and 
1978 12 U S st ates enacted state law s that  eff ecti vel y decri mi nal i sed the use of cannabi s. 
M odel  used dat a fr om  t he D rug A buse W arni ng N et wo r k (DAW N)  concerni ng drug-related
em ergency room  epi sodes t o consi der t he i m pact of t hi s decri mi nal i sati on on H ospi t al
r esources.  M odel ’ s r esult s suggest   t hat   t hose  cit i es t hat   enacted decri mi nal i sati on  experi enced 
a stati sti call y  signi f i cant  i ncrease i n  cannabi s-related episodes  but   a simu l t aneously  signi f i cant 
r educt i on i n ot her drug-related episodes com pared to t he non-decri mi nal i sed area. These 
r esult s suggest   t hat ,   assum ing t he drug usi ng popul ati on t o be stable over  t he peri od,   a pure 
subst i t ut i on  eff ect  bet w een cannabi s and  ot her  drugs  wa s   t aking  pl ace r esult i ng  i n  a change  of 
burden upon t he heal t h aut hori t i es concerned.  Un f ort unat ely,  M odel  does not  then go on t o 
di scuss t he change i n f i nanci al  burden r esult i ng i n t he shif t   i n episode t ype.   N onet hel ess,  t he 
wo r k does hi ghl i ght   t he possibi l i t y t hat   drug use i m poses s om e burden on t he healt h system . 
Ho we v e r ,  one can qui ckly draw  up a l i st of acti vi t i es that  indi vi dual s m ay fr eely choose t o 
pursue t hat   i m pose  ot her  burdens  on  a publ i cly  provi ded  healt h  system .  For   exam ple,  sm oki ng 
and alcohol   consum pt i on clearl y r esult  i n heal t h probl em s for wh i ch society has t o bear the 
cost of tr eatme n t ,  but  so do m any ot her acti vi t i es such as m ount aineeri ng,  pot -hol i ng,   r oad 
accident s, fatt y di ets, etc. (Bl ock,  1993).  Cul yer (1973) suggest s that  thi s argum ent  imp l i es 
t hat ,   as wi t h sm oking or  bad di ets,  drug use shoul d be di scouraged r ather  t han ma d e   i l l egal.  
Wh e t her t hi s is the case or not  very m uch depends upon t he m agni t ude of t he burdens 
generated by drug use (wh i ch could i ncl ude i ndi r ect burdens such as accident s, etc.)  and i n 
t hi s area there is very l i t t l e research to gui de pol i cy int ervent i ons.  A f i nal  poi nt  to bear in 
mi nd w i t h respect to heal t h cost s is m ade by Bl ock (1993),  w ho concedes that  the heal t h 
eff ects of  drug use are onl y a concern due t o t he m eans of  me d i cal  provi sion.   I n ot her  wo r ds,  
i f  there w as a fr ee m arket  in m edi cine accom panied by a m arket  for me d i cal insurance, the 
healt h-related argum ent s f or  prohi bi t i on  vi r t ual l y  di sappear.  
3.3 ‘Demerit’ Goods 
That  indi vi dual s shoul d be di scouraged fr om  cert ain consum pt i on choi ces because they are 22
not   acti ng  i n  t hei r   ow n  best   i nt erest  i s t he  classic pat ernal i st  argum ent   f or  prohi bi t i on  of  drugs.  
Excl udi ng any pot enti al external  costs ari sing fr om  consum pt i on of drugs,  how ever,  t he 
proposi t i on  t hat   drug  users are not   acti ng  i n  t hei r   ow n  best   i nt erests i s di f f i cult   t o  cont end  wi t h 
f or m any reasons. Cul yer ( 1973) argues t hat  i f  you assum e t hat  t he i ndi vi dual ,  w hose
behavi our  society  wi shes t o  cont r ol ,   i s a part   of  t hat   society,   t hen  eit her  t hei r   we l f are counts i n 
t he  sam e wa y   as everyone  else’s or  i t   does  not .   I n  t he  f orme r   case econom i cs cannot   provi de  a 
m eans of  j udgi ng wh e t her  one i ndi vi dual ’ s assessm ent  of  anot her’ s self   i nt erest  i s any bet t er 
t han t hat   i ndi vi dual ’ s ow n assessm ent.   I n t he l att er  case,  we   have a sit uat i on wh e r e one  set  of 
i ndi vi dual s’ assessm ent of we l f are is presum ed ‘superi or’  to anot her set of indi vi dual s’ (t he 
drug users) assessm ent of thei r  we l f are. In ot her wo r ds an external i t y i s being created in 
wh i ch the choi ces of the forme r  set of indi vi dual s are bei ng i m posed upon t he l att er.  An  
exam ple of  t hi s t ype of  di sti nct i on i s t he m odel   of  drug consum pt i on and cri me   presented by 
D oyl e and Sm it h (1997).  The authors refer t o t he m aj ori t y of i ndi vi dual s w ho hol d
preferences w here drug consum pt i on yi elds zero ut i l i t y as ‘ society’,   w ho are r esponsi bl e f or 
det ermi ni ng drug pol i cy. It  i s also assum ed that  i t  i s non-drug users w ho are adversely
aff ected by t he ext ernal i t i es created by addi cti ve drug users. Such argum ent s appear t o 
suggest  that  drug users are in som e w ay not  part  of a society,  they do not  suff er fr om  drug 
r elated acquisit i ve cri me ,  do not  cont r i but e tow ards heal t h care provi sion and t hei r
preferences are som ehow   i nferi or  t o  t he  ma j ori t y.
A  simp l er  argum ent   can be  extended  f r om   t hi s.  On e   simp l y  has  t o w onder  w hy i t   i s t hat  
t he  ‘ r est  of  society'   know s  about   t he  probl em s associated wi t h  drug  use  wh e r eas t he  i ndi vi dual  
drug user does not .  Cl earl y t hi s is not  the case if ,  as w it h sm okers, indi vi dual s m ake thei r  
choi ces in t he know l edge (or at l east part  know l edge) of the ri sks associated w it h t hei r  
consum pt i on (t hi s is the essence of the Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel ) .  In eff ect wh a t  we  a r e 
consi deri ng are issues of personal  choi ce and the restr i cti on of t hat  choi ce em bodi ed in
argum ent s concerni ng m eri t  or ‘dem eri t ’  goods.  In reference to i ndi vi dual s w ho choose t o 
t ake sti mu l ants,  Mi l l   ( 1991/ 1859,   p.   111)  concl udes t hat   ‘ t hei r   choi ce of  pl easures,  and t hei r  
m ode  of  expendi ng  t hei r   i ncom e,   aft er  sati sfyi ng  t hei r   l egal  and  mo r al  obl i gat i ons  t o  t he  St ate 
and t o i ndivi dual s, are thei r  ow n concern,  and m ust  rest wi t h t hei r  ow n j udgem ent ’ .  Bl ock 
( 1996) forma l i ses thi s argum ent  wi t h reference to t he gai ns i n w el f are result i ng fr om  t wo  
i ndi vi dual s tr ading i n curr entl y prohi bi t ed goods.  Bl ock argues t hat  t he w el f are of t hir d
part i es, assum ing t hei r  r i ght s to person and propert y are not  bei ng vi ol ated, shoul d be
di sregarded  i n  t hi s cont ext:  23
…  A  t hi rd part y  can verbal l y  oppose  any  gi ven  t rade.  But   t hat   opposi t i on  cannot  
be revealed through m arket  choi ces in t he sam e w ay t hat   t r ade bet w een t he t wo  
part i es  i ndi cates  a  posi t i ve  evaluat i on  of  t he  t r ansacti on.
( Bl ock,   1996,   p.   434).
The pr obl em  econom i sts face w it h respect to t hese argum ent s is that  there are no t ool s for 
‘ m easuri ng’ subj ecti ve val ues such that  the ext ernal i t i es and m eri t  goods fr am ew orks are 
com pati bl e. Indeed, even if  t here existed such a m easure, t he phi l osophi cal and et hi cal
probl em s w oul d  sti l l   r em ain.
3.4 Productivity and Labour Supply
A  f r equent l y cit ed consequence of  i l l i cit   drug use i s i t s i m pact  on l abour  f orce part i cipat i on,  
part i cularl y w i t h respect to chroni c absenteeism . The pr i ma r y concern i n t hi s respect is that  
r educed labour ma r ket  experi ence of drug users w il l  ul t i ma t ely result  in a l ow er aggregate 
l evel  of  hum an  capit al  accum ulati on  wh i ch wi l l   t end  t o  r educe overall   product i vi t y  and  hence 
l i vi ng  standards  i n  a com peti t i ve  gl obal   ma r ket .   I n  ot her  wo r ds,   t here i s an external   cost  bei ng 
i m posed  on  t he  r est  of  society  wh e n   drug  users do  not   i nvest   i n  hum an  capit al  f orma t i on.   That  
drug use rendersi ndi vi dual s less econom i call y product i ve i s very di f f i cult  t o est abli sh
em pir i call y.   Mi r on  &  Zwi ebel  ( 1995)  r efut e t he  argum ent   r eferr i ng  t o  wo r k  by  No r m and  et  al .
( 1994)  and  Wi ni ck ( 1991),   wh i ch suggest s t hat   i f   anyt hi ng,   except  f or  t he  heaviest  users,  t here
exists a posi t i ve  r elati onshi p  bet w een i ndi vi dual   earni ngs  and  self -report ed drug  use  or  at  l east 
no negat i ve relati onshi p.  The mot i vat i on for quest i oni ng t he relati onshi p bet w een drug use 
and l abour ma r ket  out com es is the recogni t i on of the possi bl e si mu l t aneit y of drug use and 
wa g e s ,  and t he exi stence of unobserved het erogenei t y,  wh i ch raise questi ons about  t he
di r ecti on of  causali t y i n a wa g e   equat i on i nvol vi ng a m easure of  drug use as an expl anatory 
vari able.
The  r elati onshi p  bet w een subst ance abuse and l abour  ma r ket   status t ends not   t o generate 
any consensus i n t he l i t erature. For  exam ple, alt hough m ost  econom i sts w oul d argue t hat  
subst ance abuse w il l  im pact on l abour suppl y,  perhaps t hrough som e det r i me n t al eff ect on 
healt h,   t here are som e t hat   argue t hat   i t   i s unem pl oym ent   t hat   t ends t o f ost er  drug use,   r ather 
t han  t he  r everse ( Peck and  Pl ant,   1987).   Wh e r e t here i s agreem ent  over  t he  l i kel y  di r ecti on  of 
causali t y,   t here i s a mi xt ure of  r esult s t hat   l eave t he i m pact  of  subst ance use on l abour  suppl y
open t o quest i on.   For   exam ple,  i n consi deri ng alcohol   abuse and l abour  suppl y,   Mu l l ahy and 
Si ndel ar (1991) and M ul l ahy and Si ndel ar (1996) fi nd a st ati sti call y si gni f i cant negat i ve 24
associati on bet w een t hese vari ables,  wh e r eas K enkel   and Ri bar  ( 1994)  do not   ( alt hough t hey 
f i nd a sm all  stati sti call y si gni f i cant negat i ve associati on bet w een heavy dri nki ng and t he 
l abour suppl y of ma l es).  The di f f erent concl usi ons t hat  are draw n fr om  t hese studi es m ay 
r elate t o  t he  di f f erent  defi ni t i ons  of  l abour  suppl y  t hat   are used.   K enkel   and  Ri bar  f ocus  on  t he 
hours of  l abour  suppl i ed wh e r eas bot h  t he  Mu l l ahy  and  Si ndel ar  papers f ocus  on  part i cipat i on.  
Ho we v e r ,  K aestner (1994a),  usi ng t he sam e dat a set as K enkel  and Ri bar (t h e  US Na t i onal  
Longi t udi nal  Sur vey of Y out h–  N L S Y ) ,  fi nds a negat i ve associati on bet w een m ari j uana 
( cannabi s)  or  cocaine  use  and  t he  hours of  l abour  suppl i ed by  young  ma l es.
Al l  these st udi es deal wi t h t he i ssue of endogenei t y of subst ance abuse and labour 
ma r ket   out com es i n standard wa y s ,   yet   t here appears t o be a l ack of  consensus i n t he r esult s. 
Ag a i nst  thi s, Zar ki n et  al .  (1998a) suggest  that  subst ance abuse and hours w orked are not  
endogenousl y det ermi ned.  Fol l ow i ng ext ensive t ests for exogenei t y of subst ance abuse
vari ables,  t hey  esti ma t e a singl e equat i on  m odel   of  l abour  suppl y  f or  a sam ple of  18  t o  24  year 
ol d m en t aken fr om  t h e  US Na t i onal  H ousehol d Survey on D rug A buse.  They f i nd no 
signi f i cant  r elati onshi p  bet w een past   m ont h  l abour  suppl y  and  t he  use  of  cigarett es,  alcohol   or 
cocaine i n t he past m ont h.  Al t hough t hey fi nd a si gni f i cant posi t i ve associati on w i t h past  
m ont h cannabi s use, they concl ude t hat  there is li t t l e evidence t o support  a robust  labour 
suppl y-drug use relati onshi p.  Si mi l arl y,  alt hough K aest ner’ s (1994a) cross secti onal  result s
support  a negat i ve relati onshi p bet w een drug use and hours of l abour suppl i ed, hi s
l ongi t udi nal  esti ma t es do not  support  any system ati c eff ect of drug use on l abour suppl y.
K aestner  concl udes:  
…  Ther e does  not   appear  t o  be  a com m on  experi ence wi t h  r egard t o  drug  use  and 
l abour  suppl y,   and  publ i c pol i cies shoul d  r efl ect  t hi s f act  i f   t hey  are t o  be  eff ecti ve 
and cost  eff i cient.  The goal  of pol i cy w oul d be t o i dent i f y t hose i ndi vi dual s for 
wh i ch  i l l i cit   drug  use  does  becom e  probl em ati c.” 
( K aestner,   1994a,   p.   145).
I n addi t i on t o t he associati on bet w een drug use and unem pl oym ent ,   t here i s a grow i ng 
body of em pir i cal evidence i n t he l abour econom i cs li t erature that  suggest s that  once
endogenei t y i s accounted for,  one rarely fi nds a si gni f i cant negat i ve rel ati onshi p bet w een 
subst ance abuse and w ages. K aestner (1991),  usi ng dat a fr om  t he N LSY ,  fi nds t hat ,  i f  
anyt hi ng,  i ncreased fr equency of i l l i cit  drug use (i n t hi s case cocaine or ma r i j uana) i s
associated wi t h  hi gher  wa g e s .   Thi s r esult ,   consi stent  across gender  and  age groups,   wa s   f ound 
usi ng a H eckm an t wo- s t age esti ma t e of  a wa g e   equat i on.   Li kew i se,  Gi l l   and Mi chaels ( 1992) 25
and Regi ster and W i l l i am s (1992),  usi ng t he sam e dat a as K aestner but  sli ght l y di f f erent 
approaches t o cont r ol   f or  t he self -selecti on  of   i ndi vi dual s i nt o  drug  use  and  t he  l abour  ma r ket ,  
f i nd very si mi l ar result s. These fi ndi ngs echo t he result s that  have been found for t he 
r elati onshi p bet w een alcohol  and w ages.  For  exam ple B erger and Lei gh (1988),  usi ng dat a 
f r om  t he US  Qu a l i t y of  Empl oym ent   Sur vey and t aking account   of  self -selecti on,   f ound t hat  
dri nkers r eceive hi gher  wa g e s ,   on average,  com pared t o non-dri nkers.  Mo r e r ecent  wo r k has 
r ecogni sed a non-l i near relati onshi p bet w een alcohol  consum pt i on and w ages.  For  exam ple, 
usi ng di f f erent sources of dat a, Fr ench and Zarki n (1995),  He i en (1996),  Ha mi l t on and 
Ha mi l t on (1997) and M acD onal d and Shi elds (1998,  2001) present result s that  support  an 
i nverse U-shaped relati onshi p bet w een dri nki ng i nt ensit y and w ages (alt hough Zarki n et  al .
( 1998b) reject thei r  previous result s in support  of a posi t i ve return t o w ages across a w ide 
r ange  of  alcohol   consum pt i on  l evels).  
Ther e is, how ever,  som e research that  quest i ons t hi s general vi ew . As  a  f ol l ow-up t o 
previous result s, K aestner (1994b) presents cross-secti onal  and l ongi t udi nal  esti ma t es using 
t wo   wa v e s   of  t he  NLSY.   The  cross secti onal   r esult s are generall y  consi stent  wi t h  t he  previous 
studi es,  but   t he  l ongi t udi nal   esti ma t es onl y  provi de  part i al  support   f or  t he  posi t i ve  r elati onshi p 
bet w een drug use and w ages.  The r esult s suggest  that  the w age-drug use relati onshi p vari es 
accordi ng t o t he t ype of drug and i ndi vi dual :  for exam ple a posit i ve relati onshi p bet w een 
cocaine use and w ages for fem ales, but  a negat i ve relati onshi p bet w een m ari j uana use and 
wa g e s   f or  ma l es.  Mo r eover,   K andel  et  al .   ( 1995)  suggest   t hat   t he r elati onshi p bet w een drug 
use and wa g e s   wi l l   vary wi t h t he stage of  an i ndi vi dual ’ s career.   Us i ng a f ol l ow-up  cohort   of 
t he  NLSY,   t hey  f i nd  a posi t i ve  r elati onshi p  bet w een drug  use  and  wa g e s   i n  t he  earl y  stages  of 
an i ndi vi dual ’ s career,   but   a negat i ve r elati onshi p l ater  on i n t he career  ( i n t he mi d-t hi r t i es).
Ho we v e r ,   Bur gess and  Pr oper  ( 1998),   usi ng  t he  sam e dat a source,  are not   able t o  r epli cate t hi s 
f i ndi ng.  In t hei r  analysi s they consi der the eff ects of earl y l i f e behavi our (such as drug and 
alcohol  consum pt i on) and l ater li f e out com es, incl udi ng product i vi t y.  Thei r  result s suggest  
t hat   adol escent  alcohol   and  soft   drug  use  has  l i t t l e or  no  eff ect  on  t he  earni ngs  of  me n   i n  t hei r  
l ate twe n t i es or thi r t i es, alt hough t hey do fi nd t hat  earl y hard drug use has a si gni f i cant 
negat i ve i m pact.   Ag e   di f f erences have also been f ound by B uchm uell er  and Zuvekas ( 1998),  
w ho analysed dat a fr om  t h e  US Na t i onal  I nst i t ut e of Me n t al H ealt h’s E pidem i ol ogi cal
Ca t chm ent Ar ea (ECA)  survey t hat  wa s  c o l l ected in t he earl y ei ght i es. B uchm uell er and 
Zuvekas m ake t he sam e cri t i cism  of NLSY s t udi es as K andel et al . ,  in t hat  com pared the 
NLSY,   t he ECA  covers pri me - a g e   ( 30-45 years ol d)  wo r kers as we l l   as young peopl e.  Thei r
r esult s suggest  that  wh i l st there is evidence of a posi t i ve relati onshi p bet w een drug use and 26
i ncom e f or  young wo r kers,  t here i s str ong evidence t o suggest   t hat   ‘ probl em ati c’  drug use by 
pri me - a g e   wo r kers i s associated wi t h  l ow er  i ncom es.  
I n concl udi ng t hi s secti on we   not e t hat   apart   f r om  M acD onald and Pudney ( 2000a, b, c) 
t here is li t t l e w ork i n t hi s area that  i s set i n a Bri t i sh cont ext.  M acD onald and Pudney
( 2000a, b)  f i nd l i t t l e evidence t o support   t he K andel  et  al .   ( 1995)  l i f e-span hypot hesi s,  i ndeed, 
l i ke Bur gess and Pr opper  ( 1998),   i f   anyt hi ng t hei r   r esult s cont r adict  i t .   The  authors f i nd t hat  
t hi s result  is also gender specif i c, and onl y relevant to t he past  use of recreati onal  or soft  
drugs.   I n  part i cular,   M acD onald  and  Pudney  ( 2000b)  onl y  f i nd  a posi t i ve  associati on  bet w een 
past   r ecreati onal   drug use and t he wa g e s   of  ol der  wo me n .   Ther e i s practi call y no evidence t o 
suggest  any posi t i ve returns t o drug use for the younger cohort ,  part i cularl y for me n  ( i n al l  
cases t he esti ma t ed coeff i cients are negati ve f or  me n ) .   Wh a t   t he authors are able t o f i nd i s a 
hi ghl y  signi f i cant  r elati onshi p  bet w een dependency  drug  use  and  unem pl oym ent   ( f or  younger 
wo me n ,  ol der me n ,  and young m en and w om en w hen consi dered toget her) .  Thi s represents 
l ong-t erm  harm  t o em ploym ent  prospect s,  part i cularl y f or  young peopl e w ho wi l l   mi ss out   on 
vi t al hum an capit al i nvest me n t .  M acD onald and Pudney (2000c) suggest  t hat  t aking t he 
r elati onshi p bet w een drug use and unem pl oym ent   i nt o account   ma y   hel p expl ain w hy r ecent 
wo r k has fail ed to f i nd any si gni f i cant negat i ve relati onshi p bet w een drug use (except for 
r ecreati onal  drug use i n ol der me n )  and earni ngs.  They show  t hat  drug use (part i cularl y
dependency drugs) greatl y i ncreases the ri sk of unem pl oym ent ,  and any associ ati on w i t h 
earni ngs f or  t hose  i n  wo r k  t herefore mi sses mu c h   of  t he  i m pact.  
Cl earl y t he em pi r i cal evidence on t he l abour ma r ket  out com es of il l i cit  drug use i s 
mi xed,  but  there w oul d appear to be som e evi dence of negat i ve hum an capi t al eff ects in 
r elati on t o drug users, and h ence the l abour ma r ket  eff ects of il l i cit  drug use are a genui ne 
concern  f or  pol i cy ma k e r s.
4. The Legislative Debate
So f ar w e have consi dered two  a r eas of the econom i cs li t erature that  all ow  us t o furt her 
understand i l l i cit   drug use and i t s consequences.   I n econom i cs,  t here i s also a l i t erature t hat  
f ocuses on t he consequences of legali sing curr entl y prohi bi t ed drugs.  The maj ori t y of thi s 
l i t erature draw s upon t he t heori es out l i ned i n t he previous sect i on t o present a case that  is 
t ypi call y i n f avour  of  r epeali ng t he curr ent  prohi bi t i on l aw s.  A  ma j or  draw back wi t h mu c h   of 
t hi s w ork,  how ever,  is the apparent lack of det ail  concerni ng t he operati on of legal drugs 
ma r ket s. Wh e r eas m any com m entators rely on a di scussion of the fail ures of prohi bi t i on t o 
argue for legali sati on,  very few  (perhaps understandabl y) consi der the practi cali t i es of legal 27
( r egul ated)  drugs  ma r ket s.  Ther e are of  course som e excepti ons,   and  t hese  are t he  f ocus  of  t hi s 
bri ef secti on.  Per haps one of the m ost  vocal of the prot agoni sts in t hi s arena is Stevenson 
( 1990,   1991a, b,   1994a, b).   St evenson’s argum ent   i s qui t e str aight f orwa r d.   He   envi sages a f r ee 
ma r ket  for all  drugs w i t h a bare m ini mu m o f  regul ati on al ong t he l i nes of that  for alcohol .  
Thi s r egul ati on  w oul d  be  used  t o  safeguard  chil dren,  r estr i ct  advert i sing,   l i cence r etail   out l ets, 
and provi de r estr i cti ons f or  t he operati on of  m achinery.   St evenson argues t hat   a f r ee ma r ket  
wi t h m i ni mu m r egul ati on w oul d operate in a sociall y acceptable m anner,  bri ngi ng about  
l ow er pri ces, i ncr eased quali t y and m uch product  di f f erenti ati on.  These conclusi ons are 
ma i nl y draw n fr om  observat i ons about  t he w orki ngs of t he prohi bi t ed m arket  and how
l egali sati on wi l l   r em ove m any of  t he negat i ve consequences of  enforcem ent.   The  ma i n i ssues 
are presented bel ow ;   i n part i cular  t hose r elati ng t o t he suppl y side of  a l egal  ma r ket   and t he 
process of  adjust me n t   t ow ards  ma r ket   equi l i bri um .  
4.1 Supply in the Legal Drugs market
On e   of  t he  concerns  about   drug  use  hi ghl i ght ed i n  t he  previous  secti on  i s t he  i m pact  upon t he 
healt h  of  users ( and  t he  subsequent   burden  upon  publ i cly  provi ded  healt h  servi ces).   St evenson 
( 1994a) suggest s that  legali sati on w i l l  result  in t he orderl y m arket i ng of safe product s by 
speciali st  drug  f i r ms   ( or  existi ng  com panies w ho  alr eady  suppl y  t obacco or  alcohol )   operati ng 
i n a com peti t i ve i nt ernat i onal   ma r ket .   The  author  draw s an analogy wi t h t he pharm aceuti cal 
i ndust r y w here corporate profi t abil i t y depends on cont i nuous i nnovat i ons so t hat  ul t i ma t ely,  
l egali sati on w oul d st i mu l ate research f or synt hesi sed drugs t hat  are safe (i n t erms  o f  healt h 
eff ects)  but   share t he sam e characteri sti cs as existi ng drugs.   St evenson’s general  argum ent   i s 
t hat  legali sati on w oul d t ake the di str i but i on of drugs out  of the hands of dubi ous deal ers in 
f avour  of  l arge com panies wi t h brand nam es t o prot ect,   w ho w oul d t hus vi ew  product   safety 
as a hi gh  pri ori t y.
13  Bl ock  ( 1996)  presents a simi l ar  argum ent :  
… L e g a l i zati on w i l l  li kel y reduce drug- r elated probl em s. Imp u r i t i es in narcoti cs 
w oul d be bet t er dealt  wi t h by l egi t i ma t e busi nesses than t he present fl y- by- ni ght
operati ons  created  by  prohi bi t i on.  
( Bl ock,   1996,   p.   434).
13 Al t hough,  presum ably t he com panies w oul d have t o overcom e the st i gm a of suppl yi ng previousl y i l l egal 
subst ances.28
Of   course,  one  mi ght   argue  t hat   t hi s alr eady  exists i n  i l l egal  ma r ket s,  as dealers are unl i kel y  t o 
wa n t   t o i nt enti onal l y poi son t hei r   custom ers ( c.f .   Na d e l m ann ( 1988),   w ho cont r asts t he sm all  
num ber of narcoti c-related deaths w i t h t he huge num bers of deaths associated w it h al cohol  
and  t obacco abuse).   I n  r elati on  t o  t hi s i ssue,  t he  l egal  sancti on  of  t obacco suppl y  has  cert ainl y 
not  result ed in a ‘safe’ product ,  alt hough producers have reacted to dem and by suppl yi ng 
‘ l ow er t ar’  cigarett es. Ho we v e r ,  St evenson (1991,  1994a) and Cl ark (1992) bot h draw  a 
com pari son  wi t h  t he  alcohol   i ndust r y  t o  concl ude  t hat   consum ers are mo r e l i kel y  t o  be  cert ain 
about  the qual i t y of legall y suppl i ed drugs t han t hey w oul d be w i t h t hose fr om  an i l l i cit  
suppl y  ( e.g.   com pare ‘ m oonshi ne’  wi t h  branded  wh i sky).  
Che s he r   and  W odak  ( 1990)  also concede t he  l i kel i hood  of  qual i t y  ma i nt enance wi t hi n  a 
f r ee m arket  for drugs,  but  ma k e  r eference to t he m arket  for alcohol  to suggest  one possi bl e 
probl em  w it h t hi s m odel .  As  a  r esult  of the l egal ma r ket i ng of alcohol  and t obacco these 
product s have  becom e f i r ml y  entr enched i n  We s t ern  cult ures.  Wh a t   has  f ol l ow ed  as a r esult   of 
t he size of  l egal  alcohol   and t obacco ma r ket s are governm ent s w ho are f i nanci all y dependent  
on  t hese  l egal  drugs.   Gi ven  t hat   f ew  governm ent s are wi l l i ng  t o  t ake any  r eal  acti on  t o  r edress 
t he associated healt h probl em s t hese drugs present,   t he authors advocate cauti on wi t h r espect 
t o fol l ow i ng t he sam e rout e w it h curr entl y prohi bi t ed drugs.  A s an alt ernat i ve,  Che s he r  and 
W odak  advocate t he  suppl y  of  curr entl y  i l l egal  drugs  t hrough  a governm ent   m onopol y.   U nder 
t hi s system  a ‘use pays’ pri nci pl e w oul d be adopt ed w hereby governm ent s cont i nue t o 
di scourage drug use but   provi de drugs t hat   are t axed proport i onat ely accordi ng t o t he healt h 
and soci al costs thei r  use generates. The r evenues fr om  suppl y above cost  can then be 
all ocated to w el f are and healt h program s aime d  a t  preventi ng and t r eati ng drug related 
probl em s.  Wi t h r espect  t o t hese t ax r evenues,  Caput o and Os t r om  ( 1994)  have esti ma t ed t hat  
t he m ari j uana i ndust r y i n t he U S i n 1991 generated betw een 5.09 t o 9. 0 bi l l i on dol l ars of 
unt axed r evenue.
14  Al t hough t hi s esti ma t e i s produced assum ing a uni t ary pri ce elasti cit y of 
dem and (see later) ,  the fi gures are considered a low er bound.  It  is also w ort h not i ng t hat  a 
r ecent esti ma t e for th e  UK ma r ket  (Sl eator and A l l en, 2000),  suggest s that  legali sati on of 
cannabi s w oul d  r esult   i n a one  bi l l i on  pound  i ncrease i n  governm ent   r evenues per  year.  
The  purpose of  t hi s bri ef  secti on wa s   t o hi ghl i ght   som e of  t he debat e i n t he econom i cs 
l i t erature concerni ng al t ernat i ves t o t he prohi bi t i on of drugs.  Ther e is no em pi r i cal wo r k i n 
14  Thi s esti ma t e i s based  on  an analysi s of  seizure dat a,  i nforma t i on  on  consum pt i on  f orm  t he  Na t i onal   I nst i t ut e
of  Dr ug  A buse  nat i onal   househol d  survey,   and  Dr ug  Enf orcem ent  A gency  esti ma t es  of  str eet  pri ces  ( wi t h  dat a  on 
t obacco  product i on  and  sell i ng  cost  used  as  a  proxy  f or  cannabi s).29
t hi s area,  and  t he  concl usi ons  t hat   have  been draw n cannot   be  t ested under  curr ent  condi t i ons.  
I n  t hi s sense,  t he  cont r i but i on  t o  t he  debat e on  l egali sati on  r epresented by  t hi s wo r k  i s l i mi t ed, 
but   i t   i s based on basi c econom i c pri nci pl es.  I n t he next   secti on we   consider  t he cont r i but i on 
of  econom i cs t o  understandi ng  t he  consequences  of  curr ent  drugs  pol i cy.
4.2 Current Policy Interventions
The use of a w elf are econom i cs fr am ew ork t o analyse t he probl em  of drug m i suse oft en 
r esult s in a qui t e persuasive case against  prohi bi t i on,  or at least no com pell i ng case in i t s 
f avour.   Ho we v e r ,   apart   f r om   t he  Du t ch pol i cy of  decri mi nal i sati on  ( see de  Ko r t   1994)  and  t he 
Sout h Au s t r ali an Cannabi s Expi ati on No t i ce ( CEN)   system  ( see Sut t on &  Sar r e 1992),   t here 
are very few  governm ent s w orl d-wi de t hat   advocate anyt hi ng ot her  t han out r i ght   prohi bi t i on.  
I f  one t akes as given t he pol i cy that  drug consum pt i on i s to be reduced (t he t ypi cal publ i c 
pol i cy),   t hen i t   i s wi t h r espect  t o t he opt i ma l   use of  pol i cies t hat   econom i c analysi s can be  of 
great val ue.  A b r i ef review  of the econom i cs of drug enforcem ent pol i cies is presented in 
Wa g s t aff   and  M aynard  ( 1988).   The  authors hi ghl i ght   t he  debat e bet w een advocates of  suppl y-
side  pol i cies and  t hose  w ho  f avour  dem and-si de  pol i cies.  The  t heoreti cal   debat e i n  t hi s r espect 
i s perhaps hi ndered by a lack of informa t i on;  how ever,  there are a num ber of recent papers 
t hat   have att em pted t o address t hat   probl em .  Be f ore consi deri ng t hese f urt her  i t   i s appropri ate 
t o out l i ne t he opt i ons avail able to pol i cy m akers w here the ul t i ma t e goal  i s to reduce
consum pt i on  and  t o  hi ghl i ght   t he  debat es t hat   have  t aken pl ace i n  t hi s cont ext.
4.2.1 Supply-Side Enforcement Policies
The classic view  of drug consum pt i on i s that  dem and i s com pletely pri ce inel asti c w it h
r espect to addi cti ve goods (Rot t enburg 1968).  If  thi s is the case then t here are num erous 
i mp l i cati ons  f or  publ i c pol i cy i nt ended  t o  t arget   t he  suppl y  side.   Suppl y-side  pol i cies ( such as 
seizures, l arge-scale purchase or dest r uct i on of crops,  i ncreased severi t y of  penal t i es for 
deali ng,   etc.)   are i mp l em ented i n  order  t o  r educe t he  avail able suppl y  t o  users and  push  up  t he 
ma r ket   pri ce of  a drug  so as t o  r educe consum pt i on.   Wh e t her  or  not   t hi s occurs i n  practi ce i s a 
ma t t er  f or  debat e ( see l ater) ,   but   i f   t hi s t ype of  i nt ervent i on aff ects pri ces,  and dem and t ends 
t o be pri ce inel asti c, t he l i kel y out com e is that  suppl y-side pol i cies are self -defeati ng.
Si l verma n   and  Spr ui l l   ( 1977)  hi ghl i ght   t hi s di l e mma   qui t e succinct l y:  
… I f  the num ber of addi cts w ho do not  adjust  t hei r  habi t  [i n reacti on t o pri ce 
changes],  but  c o mmi t  cri me  t o m ai nt ain i t  is large,  society i s caught  in a vi cious 30
spir al:  Mo r e cri me  l eads to m ore vigorous suppression of the heroi n suppl y,  and 
t he  r esult i ng  r i se i n  pri ces  aggravates  t he  cri me   probl em   f urt her.
( Si l verma n   and  Spr ui l l ,   1977,   p.   81).
I n ot her  wo r ds,   suppl y-side pol i cies t hat   push up pri ces i n t he f ace of  i nel asti c dem and do no 
mo r e t han put   mo r e m oney i n t he hands of  suppl i ers.  Such  argum ent s have l ed c o mme n t ators 
t o suggest  that  dem and-si de pol i cies are li kel y t o be m ore (cost)  eff ecti ve t han suppl y-side
cont r ol .   I ndeed,  Ho l ahan ( 1973)  had  earl i er  c o mme n t ed t hat :  
…  Si nce t he dem and f or  heroi n i s mo s t   l i kel y pri ce-i nel asti c,  at  l east  over  a wi de 
r ange,   i t   i s probabl y mo r e wo r t hw hi l e t o operate di r ectl y on dem and by aff ecti ng 
such vari ables as t astes,  t he  pri ces and  avail abil i t y  of  alt ernat i ve  drugs,   t r eatme n t  
avail abil i t y,   and  so on.
( Ho l ahan,  1973,   p.   467).
Thi s discussion hi ghl i ght s tw o key debat es that  need to be addressed em pi r i cal l y.
Fi r stl y,   i s i t   t he case t hat   suppl y side enforcem ent  pol i cies,  such as seizures,  push t he pri ce of 
drugs upw ards? I f   t hi s i s t he case,  t hen do i ncreases i n pri ce r educe t he l evel  of  consum pt i on 
of drugs? A nsw ers to t hese quest i ons are fundam ent al to our assessm ent of curr ent suppl y 
side pol i cies. I n t he fol l ow i ng sect i ons w e consi der how  econom i sts have gone about
addressing t hese i ssues.
4.2.2 The Effect of Supply-Side Enforcement Policies on Price
As  a l r eady m ent i oned,  the pri ma r y ai m o f  suppl y-side enforcem ent pol i cies is to push up 
i l l i cit   drug pri ces so t hat   t hey becom e prohi bi t i ve.   Al t hough t here has been som e t heoreti cal 
debat e over  t he  i m pact  of  enforcem ent  pol i cies on  pri ces,  t here i s very  l i t t l e em pir i cal  wo r k  i n 
t hi s area. Tw o not ew ort hy excepti ons st and out .  Di Na r do (1993) has studi ed the eff ect of 
cocaine  seizures on  pri ce and,   bui l di ng  on  t hi s wo r k,   Yu a n   ( 1994)  has  consi dered t he  eff ect  of 
enforcem ent pol i cies on t he pri ce of heroi n and cocaine.  The mot i vat i on for thi s area of 
r esearch is driven by t he possi bi l i t y t hat  alt hough t he t ypi cal enforcem ent pol i cy of seizure 
m ay have som e i m pact on pri ce, it  is qui t e possibl e that  vari ati ons i n sei zures are actual l y 
dri ven by changes i n quant i t y avail able,  wh i ch aff ect  pri ce at  t he sam e t i me .   I n other  wo r ds 
t he causal relati onshi p bet w een enforcem ent and pri ces is not  necessary obvi ous.  Wh a t  is 
mo r e, as suggest ed by H ol ahan (1973),  it  is open t o debat e as to w het her even large-scale
seizures can have any eff ect  on pri ce gi ven t he pot enti all y l arge num ber  of  suppl i ers and t he 31
l ucrati ve  profi t s t hat   att r act  t hem   i nt o  t he  ma r ket .  
Di Na r do ( 1993)  i nvest i gat es t hi s i ssue by consi deri ng dat a avail able f r om  t he US  Dr ug 
Enf orcem ent Ad mi ni str ati on’s (DEA)  Syst em  to Ret r i eve Informa t i on fr om  D rug Evi dence 
( STRI DE)   and  dat a f r om   t he  M oni t ori ng  t he  Fut ure ( MT F )   sam ple of  US  hi gh  school   seniors. 
STRI DE  i s used  t o  produce  pri ce seri es f or  cocaine  and  seizure i nforma t i on,   wh e r eas t he  MT F  
dat a are used to provi de i nforma t i on on consum pt i on.  Di Na r do uses a vari ety of   esti ma t i on 
t echni ques and quasi -experi me n t s t o t est  wh e t her  vari ati ons ( over  t i me   or  by r egion)  i n DEA 
seizures of cocaine can hel p expl ain vari ati ons i n ei t her dem and or the pri ce of cocaine.  
Re ga r dl ess of t he t echni que used,  Di Na r do fi nds l i t t l e evidence t o suggest  t hat  l aw
enforcem ent  has  a stati sti call y  signi f i cant  posi t i ve  i m pact  on  t he  pri ce of  cocaine.   I f   anyt hi ng,  
t here appears t o be a negat i ve r elati onshi p bet w een seizures and cocaine pri ces.  On   t he ot her 
hand,   Di Na r do f i nds t hat   t he r elati onshi p bet w een seizures and quant i t y dem anded i s actual l y 
posi t i ve (i . e. hi gher seizures tend t o occur wh e r e the drug probl em  is greatest) .  The author 
suggest s t hat   t hi s f i ndi ng  i s consi stent  wi t h  t he  hypot hesi s t hat   seizures are di r ected wh e r e t he 
drug probl em  i s mo s t   not i ceable and t hus t hey t end t o mi r r or  dem and.   Thus,   seizures wi l l   be 
l ow est   wh e r e t he dem and f or  cocaine,   and hence pri ces,  i s l ow est .   I n ot her  wo r ds,   vari ati ons 
i n pri ce refl ect vari ati ons i n dem and;  wh e r eas enforcem ent and suppl y are endogenousl y
det ermi ned.
Yu a n ’ s (1994) approach am ount s to an extension of Di Na r do’s w ork,  t aking i nt o
account   t he  need t o  i dent i f y  t he  di r ecti on  of  any  causal  r elati onshi p  bet w een enforcem ent  and 
pri ces. As  wi t h D i Na r do,  Y uan uses data produced fr om  STRID E and est i ma t es a vector 
autoregression m odel   t o t est  t he Gr anger -causali t y bet w een enforcem ent  and drug pri ces.  The 
author also consi ders the eff ect of very l arge sei zures by com pari ng pri ces pre and post  
seizure. I n eff ect Gr anger-causali t y fr om  enforcem ent t o pri ces w ould be a corr elati on
bet w een pri ces i n  t he  curr ent  peri od  and  enforcem ent  of  previous  peri ods.   Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s qui t e 
possibl e that  any G ranger -causali t y observed t hrough aut oregression t ests is actual l y dri ven 
by a t hi r d unm easured vari able t hat   r elates t o t he t wo   vari ables under  i nvest i gat i on.   As   such, 
Yu a n   suggest s t hat   f i ndi ng  no  Gr anger -causali t y i s a mo r e r obust   r esult   t han f i ndi ng Gr anger -
causali t y.   Us i ng t i me   seri es dat a f or  135 m ont hs,   Yu a n   f i r ml y r ejects t he nul l   hypot hesi s t hat  
changes in enf orcem ent do not  Gr anger -cause changes in pri ces (alt hough t hi s is onl y
signi f i cant  wh e n   seizures are m easured i n  num ber,   not   we i ght   or  val ue).   I n  ot her  wo r ds,   Yu a n  
does  f i nd  a l i nk  bet w een enforcem ent  and  pri ces,  but   hi s r esult s suggest   t hat   t he  r elati onshi p i s 
negat i ve.   I n  addi t i on  t o  t hi s,  Yu a n   also f i nds  t hat   changes i n  cocaine  pri ces r espond  negat i vel y 
t o changes i n heroi n seizures,  and changes i n heroi n pri ces r espond negat i vel y t o changes i n 32
cocaine sei zures. Y uan confi r ms  t hese result s fr om  an analysi s of very l arge cocaine and 
heroi n sei zures and pri ce vari ati ons before and aft er the sei zures. The i mp l i cati ons ari sing 
f r om  t he w ork of Yu a n  a n d  Di Na r do are m ixed and requi r e furt her research. These result s 
coul d be reveali ng m ore about  wh a t  is happeni ng on t he dem and-si de t han t he suppl y-side,
wh e r eby dem and i s being reduced (as a result  of the i ncrease in perceived ri sk fol l ow i ng 
observed  seizures)
15  mo r e t han  suppl y  i s bei ng  r educed and  hence  pri ce i s f all i ng.  
4.2.3 The Effect of Price Changes on Consumption
W e have al r eady seen that  there is som e debate over wh e t her enforcem ent actual l y has any 
eff ect on pri ces. Ho we v e r ,  assum ing t hat  hi gher pri ces are sti l l  a pol i cy goal ,  it  is clearl y 
essenti al to understand how  pri ces aff ect consum er behavi our.  Indeed, not  onl y are pri ce 
elasti cit i es of dem and i m port ant for evaluat i ng enforcem ent pol i cies, such informa t i on i s 
r elevant for assessing t he i m pact of alt ernat i ve pol i cies to prohi bi t i on (Lee, 1993).  The 
speculati on about   t he ow n pri ce elasti cit y of  dem and f or  drugs hi ghl i ght ed earl i er  i s not   we l l  
entr enched in em pi r i cal research. Wh e r eas there has been considerable research int o t he 
dem and elasti cit i es of  alcohol   and t obacco ( as di scussed earl i er  i n secti on 2),   r esearch i n t he 
area of  i l l i cit   drugs  i s som ew hat  pat chy.   Of   course t he  ma i n  obst acle t o  progress i n  t hi s area i s 
t he l ack of  avail able dat a.  Ther e are how ever  som e not able excepti ons t o t he general  l ack of 
acti vi t y i n t hi s i m port ant  r esearch area.  Be f ore we   consi der  t hese,   we   shoul d f i r st  di scuss t he
t heoreti cal  debat e about   pri ce r esponsi veness  of  drug  users.
Ther e has been considerable debat e as to w het her dem and behavi our in i l l i cit  drug 
ma r ket s is part i cularl y pri ce inel asti c. M oore (1973,  1990) suggest s that  it  is the ‘eff ecti ve 
pri ce’ t hat  i so f  relevance to drug users not  t he m arket  pri ce and that  any reduct i on i n
consum pt i on f ol l ow i ng a pri ce r i se i s suff i cient  t o j ust i f y suppl y-side pol i cies.  Thi s eff ecti ve 
pri ce mi ght   be defi ned by an i ndex i ncl udi ng t he ma r ket   pri ce,  t he puri t y of  t he drug,   r i sk of 
t he m arket ,  etc. As  s u c h ,  di f f erent users w il l  r eact i n di f f erent w ays accordi ng t o t he
know l edge t hey have t o det ermi ne an eff ecti ve pri ce. Thi s m ight  we l l  be t r ue for,  say, 
experi me n t al users, w ho w oul d have w eak know l edge of t he m arket  and subsequent l y be 
som ew hat pri ce responsi ve.  B ecker et al .  (1991) extend t he t heoreti cal debat e about  t he 
possibi l i t y of di f f erent pri ce responses for di f f erent users by recourse to t he Rat i onal
A ddi cti on m odel   di scussed earl i er.   Thei r   argum ent   i s t hat   t he young and poor  are mo r e l i kel y 
t o react to m oney pri ce changes because typi call y t hey pl ace a sm all er m onet ary val ue on 
15  Al t hough  t hi s coul d  be  a  pol i cy  aim  i n  i t self .33
healt h and ot her  f ut ure harmf ul   eff ects,  wh i ch i n t heory shoul d f orm  part   of  t he t ot al  cost  of 
an addi cti ve good.   Ther efore,  as pri ce becom es a bi gger  share of  t ot al  cost  ( as i n t he case of 
younger or poorer users),  long-run changes i n dem and brought  about  by changes i n pri ce 
becom e l arger  r elati ve t o changes t hat   mi ght   be brought   about   by changes i n t ot al  f ut ure cost.  
I n ot her  wo r ds,   l ow er  i ncom e peopl e ( or  younger  peopl e)  t end t o r espond mo r e t o changes i n 
pri ce t han do hi gher  i ncom e peopl e ( or  ol der  peopl e),   w ho t end t o r eact  mo r e t o changes i n 
f ut ure harmf ul   eff ects. 
Wa g s t aff  and M aynard (1988) provi de an alt ernat i ve vi ew  of dem and el asti cit i es.  The 
authors present  a ‘ doubl e-kinked’  dem and curve at  t he aggregate l evel  t hat   i s a synt hesi s of 
t wo   di am etr i call y opposed vi ew s ori gi nal l y suggest ed by Bl air   and V ogel   ( 1973)  and Wh i t e 
and  Lukset i ch ( 1983).   The  r esult   i s a ma r ket   dem and  curve  t hat   exhi bi t s t wo   elasti c segm ents, 
one at  l ow  pri ces and one at  hi gh pri ces,  and a general  i nel asti c segm ent  coveri ng t he mi ddl e 
r ange  of  pri ces.  Bl air   and  V ogel   ( 1973)  argue  t hat   at  l ow   pri ces t he  ma r ket   wi l l   consi st  of  bot h 
addi cts and recreati onal  users. Wh e n  p r i ces increase dem and w il l  fall  as recreati onal  users 
l eave the m arket  (i n favour of subst i t ut es) and addi cts curt ail  thei r  consum pt i on t ow ards 
ma i nt enance doses. Beyond som e pri ce the m arket  wi l l  onl y consi st of addi cti ve users w ho 
exhi bi t   pri ce i nel asti c dem and.   Wh i t e and Lukset i ch ( 1983),   on t he ot her  hand,   consi der  t he 
eff ect of very hi gh pri ces; suggest i ng t hat  aft er a cert ain pri ce the eff ort s to raise funds 
becom e prohi bi t i ve and addi cts w il l  leave the m arket  (t o enrol  on t r eatme n t  program m es or
due t o arr est and convi cti on).  I f  Wa g s t aff  and M aynard’s synthesi sed shape of
cont em poraneous dem and curve we r e f ound t o exist  t hen t here are consi derable i mp l i cati ons 
f or publ i c pol i cy, dependi ng on t he l ocati on of ma r ket  equi l i bri um .  Un f ort unat ely t here is 
l i t t l e or  no evidence t o support   such a hypot hesi s,  alt hough t here have been som e att em pts t o 
esti ma t e t he  pri ce elasti cit y  of  dem and  f or  som e drugs  wh i ch we   wi l l   now   consi der.  
On e   of  t he earl i est  att em pts at  ‘ m easuri ng’  t he pri ce elasti cit y of  dem and f or  a drug i s 
presented i n Si l verma n   and Spr ui l l   ( 1977).   The  f ocus of  t hi s r esearch i s an i nvest i gat i on i nt o 
t he relati onshi p bet w een a pri ce index for retail  heroi n and m ont hl y-recorded cri me s ,  the 
assum pti on bei ng t hat  heroi n expendi t ure is a funct i on of t he retail  pri ce and quant i t y
consum ed.   Thi s r elati onshi p bet w een expendi t ure and consum pt i on can be simp l y expressed 
as:
, ) . ( t t t P P H D = ( 7)34
wh e r e,P t   i s t he pri ce of  heroi n and H (Pt )   i s t he quant i t y consum ed at  t hi s pri ce.  I n t hi s case,
heroi n consum pt i on i s assum ed t he f ol l ow i ng f unct i on f orm:
, 0
h h t P t H = ( 8)
wh e r e h i s the el asti cit y of heroi n consum pt i on w i t h respect t o pri ce. Thi s yields an
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Un f ort unat ely,   appropri ate dat a t o  esti ma t e ( 9)  di r ectl y  we r e not   avail able t o  t he  authors, 
so an alt ernat i ve  approach wa s   t aken.  Si l verma n   and  Spr ui l l ,   suggest   t hat   t he  wi l l i ngness  of  an 
addi ct  t o adjust   consum pt i on i n r eacti on t o pri ce changes i s r elated t o t he t ol erance bui l t   up 
and t he avail abil i t y of  subst i t ut es ( e.g.   me t hadone).   As   such,  t hey m odel   pri ce elasti cit y as a 
nonst ochast i c funct i on of the pot ency of heroi n and i t s pri ce relati ve t o recent pri ces. Thi s 
r elati onshi p  i s gi ven  as:
() , 2 1
t t t P P S e e
− − + = l l h ( 10)
wh e r e t P i s the average pri ce of heroi n i n t he 4 m ont hs pri or to m ont h t ,  Pt  is the pri ce of 
heroi n i n m ont h t  and St  is the pot ency (puri t y) of the average retail  sale in m ont h t .  The 
m odel  wa s  e s t i ma t ed using m ont hl y dat a fr om  D et r oi t  duri ng t he peri od N ovem ber 1970 
t hrough Jul y 1973.  As  we  wi l l  see, fr om  t hi s equat i on i nferences can be m ade about  the 
elasti cit y of heroi n dem and based on heroi n pri ces and cri me  d a t a onl y.  Ther e are som e 
caveats that  shoul d be observed nevert hel ess. Fi r stl y h i n (10) wi l l  onl y t r ul y represent 
elasti cit y of  dem and under  t he condi t i on wh e r e  1 = t t P P   and hence i t   i s a m easure of  ‘ l ong-
r un’  elasti cit y.   A  second r equi r em ent  i s t hat   pri ce changes are caused by shif t s i n exogenous
suppl y i . e.  t he dem and curve i s stable.  A not her  caveat  i s t hat   t he pri ce and pot ency dat a used 
by Si l verm an and Sprui l l  refl ect condi t i ons i n onl y one heroi n m arket  (De t r oi t )  and w ere 
esti ma t ed f r om   dat a acqui r ed by  t he  DEA.   The  f i nal   r esult s we r e esti ma t ed usi ng l east  squares 
r egression on a l og l i near  cri me   m odel   i ncorporati ng ( 10).   The  esti ma t es suggest   signi f i cant 
val ues of l1 and l2 of 0. 251 and 0. 670 respecti vel y.  Thus,  for a relati ve pri ce level of 1 35
( 1 = t t P P )   and a pot ency of  2. 5% ,  the l ong-run elasti cit y of  consum pt i on i s –0.267  ( r educi ng 
t o– 0 . 247  f or  10%   pot ency).   Thi s suggest s t hat   a 10%   pri ce i ncrease i n  r etail   heroi n  wi l l   r esult  
i n  onl y  a 2. 7%   r educt i on  i n  consum pt i on.
Al t hough t he Si l verma n   and Spr ui l l   r esult s can onl y be vi ewed  as t entati ve,   t hei r   wo r k 
stood al one i n t he l i t erature unt i l  the subj ect wa s  r evisit ed by Caul ki ns (1995b),  Br ett evil l e-
Jensen and Sut t on (1996),  and G rossm an and C haloupka (1998).  The approach taken by 
Ca ul ki ns i s to ci r cum vent the l ack of reli able data on quant i t y and pri ce by part i t i oni ng t he 
pri ce elasti cit y  i nt o  t he  product   of  t wo   elasti cit i es t hat   i nvol ve  an i nt erme d i ate quant i t y  w hose 
r elati onshi p w i t h m arket  quant i t y can be m odel l ed. Us i ng dat a fr om  t h e  US Dr ug U se 
For ecasti ng Syst em ,
16  Ca ul ki ns i ncl udes t he percentage of arr estees testi ng posi t i ve for the 
drug i n quest i on as an int erme d i ate vari able. The m odel  breaks the probl em  int o a seri es of 
simp l er esti ma t i on probl em s that  i ncl udes t he arr ests of drug users and non-users (bot h
unrelated to drug use and as a funct i on of drug use) and a funct i on of spendi ng on drugs.  
Us i ng dat a f r om  t he STRI DE  t o produce pri ce seri es,  Ca ul ki ns com bines t hi s wi t h t he arr est 
dat a f r om  t he Dr ug Us e   For ecasti ng Syst em  t o produce a num ber  of  pri ce elasti cit y esti ma t es
vi a t wo   stage l east  squares r egression.   I n part i cular,   he esti ma t es t he elasti cit y of  dem and f or 
cocaine  t o  be –2. 5 and t hat   f or  heroi n t o be –1. 5.   Al t hough t hese are i n sharp cont r ast  t o t he 
r esult s f or  Si l verma n   and Spr ui l l   ( 1977),   t he err or  bands around t he poi nt   esti ma t es are qui t e 
l arge  due  t o  t he  m any  dat a uncert aint i es and,   conceivabl y,   t he  esti ma t e f or  cocaine  coul d  be  as 
sm all   as –0. 5.
The  em pir i cal  debat e over  t he t r ue nat ure of  dem and elasti cit i es i s f urt her  m uddl ed by 
t he w ork of Br ett evil l e-Jensen and Sut t on (1996) w ho i nt r oduce a new  di sti nct i on bet w een 
‘ ordi nary’  drug users and dealer-users.  The  authors use dat a on 500 i ndi vi dual s coll ected vi a 
quest i onnai r e fr om  at t endant s at a needle exchange servi ce in O sl o,  No r wa y .  The dat a
i ncl udes i nforma t i on concerni ng i ncom e (and i t s sources),  heroi n consum pt i on,  deali ng
acti vi t y  ( r ecogni sing  t hat   drug  users wi l l   oft en sw it ch t o  deali ng  t o  f i nance  t hei r   consum pt i on) 
and pri ces paid.  In addi t i on t o t hi s informa t i on,  t he aut hors also incl ude dat a regardi ng
att i t udes t ow ard ri sk, the eff ect of arr est on st atus and i nforma t i on on exchange vi sit s and 
syri nge di str i but i on.  Us i ng t hi s data B rett evil l e-Jensen and Sut t on est i ma t e three m odels in 
t urn.  The f i r st i s a sw it ching regression m odel  of heroi n consum pt i on w i t h endogenous 
sw it ching on deali ng status.   Ob s e r vi ng t hat   t he consum pt i on of  dealers and non-deal ers coul d 
16 Thi s progra mme  wa s  r ecentl y re- l aunched as t he A rr estee D rug A buse M oni t ori ng Progra mme  ( ADAM) ,  
wh i ch  wa s   t he  basi s of  t he  NEW - ADAM  progra mme   curr entl y  r unni ng  i n  Engl and  and  Wa l es.36
be deri ved fr om  a t w o-equat i on l atent str uct ure, the aut hors joi nt l y est i ma t e these w i t h an 
auxi l i ary equat i on t hat   all ow s f or  self -selecti on  of  deali ng status.   The  second m odel   i s a self -
selecti on m odel  of t he quant i t y of heroi n sol d by deal ers, j oi nt l y est i ma t ed w it h t he
part i cipat i on equat i on fr om  t he fi r st m odel .  Fi nal l y,  spli ne funct i ons are int r oduced i nt o t he 
sw it ching r egression m odel  t o t est for di f f erent forms  o f  the relati onshi p bet w een pri ce and 
consum pt i on.   Br ett evil l e-Jensen and  Sut t on  f i nd  t hat   t he  pri ce elasti cit y  of  dem and  f or  dealers 
i s mu c h   sm all er  ( i n  m agni t ude)  t han  t hat   of  non-deal ers ( -0.20  com pared t o  –1. 23).   The  caveat 
t o be observed here though i s that  the result s also suggest  that  indi vi dual s do not  ma k e  t he 
choi ce to deal  independent l y of thei r  consum pt i on.  In ot her wo r ds,  if  dealers are heavier 
consum ers they are m ore li kel y t o be l ess pri ce-responsi ve.  Ho we v e r ,  alt hough t he est i ma t e 
f or dealers is simi l ar to t he Si l verm an and Sprui l l  (1977) esti ma t e, the m arket  condi t i ons i n 
De t r oi t   duri ng  t he  earl y  sevent i es are l i kel y  t o  be  qui t e di f f erent  f r om   t hose  prevail i ng  i n  earl y 
ni net i es O slo.  The ot her i m port ant r esult  Br ett evil l e-Jensen and Sut t on report  i s on t he 
hypot hesi sed ‘doubl e-ki nked’ dem and curve,  ori gi nal l y proposed by W agst aff  and M aynard 
( 1988).  The r esult s of the est i ma t ed spli ne funct i ons (wh i ch all ow  for varyi ng el asti cit y i n 
di f f erent segm ents of t he dem and curve) off er no evi dence t o support  t he hypot hesi s.
Al t hough t hese r esult s are onl y based on a r ange of  pri ces quot ed i n Os l o over  one year  ( and 
Wa g s t aff   and M aynard off er  no i ndi cati on of  t he pri ce r anges at  wh i ch t he slope of  dem and 
mi ght  change) they do cast  doubt  on t he practi cal existence of a m ult i -segm ented dem and 
curve  f or  addi cti ve  drugs.  
Ot her esti ma t es w ort hy of consi derati on are N isbet and V aki l  (1972) and van O urs 
( 1995).  Ni sbet and V aki l  ( 1972) consi der t he pri ce elasti cit y of dem and for ma r i j uana
( cannabi s)  usi ng dat a coll ected vi a an anonym ous post al  quest i onnai r e of  student s.  Al t hough 
t he me t hodol ogy i s pot enti all y obj ecti onabl e,  t he r esearchers asked t he student s t o t r ace t hei r  
ow n dem and funct i ons and t hi s informa t i on,  coupl ed w it h ot her actual  dat a, we r e used to 
esti ma t e a l i near  and a doubl e l og dem and f unct i on.   Us i ng simp l e r egression t echni ques,   t he 
authors suggest  pri ce elasti cit i es of dem and for cannabi s at t he goi ng m arket s pri ces of
bet w een –0.36  t o  –1. 51.   Ther e are of  course ma n y   caveats t o  t hese  r esult s,  not   l east  t he  nat ure 
of dat a coll ecti on,  but  they are useful  indi cators of pri ce sensit i vi t y of cannabi s dem and.  A 
qui t e dif f erent approach is presented in V an O urs (1995),  w ho t akes a retr ospect i ve l ook at  
Op i um  dem and i n t he Dut ch East Indi es (I ndonesi a) for the peri od 1923 t o 1938.  The dat a 
we r e coll ected duri ng t he so-call ed O pium regi e, a system  by w hi ch the i m port ati on,
product i on and sal e of opi ates w as operated via a state m onopol y.  The Dut ch governm ent  
i nt ended t o use t he system  to reduce cri mi nal i t y,  guarantee puri t y and ul t i ma t ely reduce 37
opi um   use.   To  esti ma t e pri ce elasti cit i es,  van  Ou r s used  consum pt i on  dat a f r om   22  r egions  f or 
t he peri od under consi derati on and const r uct ed seri es for t he real opi um  pri ce and real
i ncom e.  Us i ng t wo  s t age least squares, the el asti cit y of dem and for opi um  i n t he peri od i s 
esti ma t ed at  –0. 7  and  –1. 0  f or  t he  short   and  l ong-run  r especti vel y.
Cl earl y  t here i s not   yet   a consensus  on  t he  possibl e r ange  of  pri ce elasti cit i es f or  cert ain 
drugs.The vari ous em pi r i cal esti ma t es found i n t he l i t erature are  s u mma r i sed in Tabl e 1. 
Al t hough t hese fi gures il l ust r ate the w i de range of esti ma t es that  have been presented, the 
general concl usi on m ust  be t hat  f or m any drugs consum er dem and i s to som e ext ent
r esponsi ve t o changes i n m arket  pri ce and therefore pol i cy int ervent i ons need t o be devi sed 
wi t h  t hi s i n  mi nd.   I ndeed,  t hese  r esult s suggest   t hat   i l l i cit   drug  users are on  average j ust   as,  or 
even m ore responsi ve t o pri ce changes than ci garett e sm okers, al t hough one m ust  bear in 
mi nd t he err or bands on al l  these est i ma t es (see Labeaga (1999) for a discussion of recent 
esti ma t es of  t he  pri ce elasti cit y  of  dem and  f or  cigarett es).
Tabl e 1.   S u mma r y  of  pri ce elasti cit y  esti ma t es f or  vari ous  drugs
Au t hor(s) D rug(s) Dat aE l asti cit y
Br ett evil l e- Jensen &  Sut t on  ( 1996) Heroi nQ u e s t i onnai r e of
No r we g i an  addi cts
- 0. 20  ( dealers)
- 1. 23  ( non- dealers)
Ca ul ki ns  ( 1995b) H eroi n &
C ocaine
Dr ug U se Forecasti ng
Syst em   and  STRI DE
–2. 5  ( C ocaine)
–1. 5  ( He r oi n)
Gr ossm an &  Cha l oupka  ( 1998) Cocai ne M oni t ori ng t he Fut ure
Sur vey  and  STRI DE
- 0. 96  (short   run)
- 1. 35  ( l ong  r un)
Ni sbet  &  Va k i l   ( 1972) Cannabi sQ u e s t i onnai r e of UCLA
student s
- 0. 36  ( l ow er  bound)
- 1. 51  (upper  bound)
Si l verma n   &  Spr ui l l   ( 1977) Heroi n M ont hl y dat a  (1970-
1973)  f r om   De t r oi t
- 0. 27
van  Ou r s ( 1995) O pium G overnm ent  dat a fr om
1923-38
- 0. 7  ( short   r un)
- 1. 0  ( l ong  r un)
4.2.4 Demand-Side Policies
I n t he previous secti on we   consi dered how  pol i cies aime d   at  aff ecti ng drug suppl y mi ght   be 
evaluat ed.  We   now  t urn our att enti on t o t he pol i cies aime d   at  changing consum er  dem and f or 
drugs.   Ther e t ends not   t o be a great  deal  of  di scussion i n t he econom i cs l i t erature about   t he 38
eff i cacy or  desi r abil i t y of  so-call ed dem and-si de pol i cies.  Thi s i s perhaps understandable,  as 
t he t ypi cal aim o f  t hese pol i cies is to reduce the consum pt i on of i l l i cit  drugs t hrough
educati on,  r ehabil i t ati on or harm r educt i on progra mme s ,  wh e r eas econom i sts have been
concerned  wi t h  t he  mo r e general  consequences  of  addi cti ve  behavi our  ( Buc k  et  al .   1996).   We  
have al r eady seen that  drug users are li kel y t o respond t o pri ce changes, part i cularl y i n t he 
l ong  r un  and  t hat   pol i cies t hat   bri ng  about   l ong-t erm  changes i n  drugs  pri ces wi l l   have  a mo r e 
l asti ng  aff ect  t han  t em porary  ‘ wa r s on  drugs’.   Ho we v e r ,   we   also need t o  consi der  pol i cies t hat  
are aime d   at  addi cts di r ectl y.   I n t hi s r espect,   we   can r efl ect  on t wo   opposi ng out com es i n t he 
l i t erature: one t hat  com es fr om  t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on fr am ew ork and one t hat  is based on 
em pir i cal  evidence,   albei t   at  a l ocal  l evel.
W hen analysed i n t he cont ext of t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel ,  harm r educt i on
program m es have been cri t i cised for bei ng count er product i ve (Ne r i  and H eather,  1995;  
St evenson,  1994a).   The  r eason f or  t hi s concl usi on i s t hat   harm- r educt i on i ni t i ati ves,  such as 
needle exchanges and i nforma t i on centr es,  eff ecti vel y r educe t he expected cost  of  addi cti on.  
Thi s i s because r ati onal   addi cts wi l l   t ake account   of  t he  t ot al  cost  of  drugs,   wh i ch i ncl udes  t he 
extr a cost  and r i sk ( or  f ut ure harm)   associated wi t h i l l egal  acti vi t y ( e.g.   i m puri t i es,  vi ol ence, 
t he ri sk of AI DS f r om  shari ng needl es, search costs, etc.) .  Ha r m r educt i on progra mme s  
t ypi call y reduce m ort ali t y and t he expect ed fut ure harmf ul  consequences of addi cti on,  and 
hence t he t ot al cost.  A s a consequence,  the reduct i on i n expect ed fut ure costs of addi cti on 
coul d  r esult   i n  greater  drug  use  ( alt hough  arguabl y  i t   i s t he  harm  caused by  drug  use  t hat   i s t he 
poi nt  of concern,  not  the am ount  per se).  The sam e argum ent  can be used about  the rol e of 
i nforma t i on w hen set  i n t he cont ext of harm r educt i on.  For  exam ple, St evenson (1994b) 
argues t hat  if  purely factual  informa t i on i s provi ded (as opposed t o governm ent  “Just say 
No ! ” cam paigns),   t hi s coul d  l ead t o  addi cts bel i eving  t hat   drug  use  i s not   as dangerous  as t hey
mi ght   have f i r st  t hought .   Ag a i n,   t hi s r educes t he expected t ot al  cost  of  drug use and i s l i kel y 
t o  i ncrease dem and.
Cont r ary t o t hi s theoreti cal predicti on,  t here is som e evidence t hat  harm- r educt i on
progra mme s   can be benefi cial.   Coi d et   al .   ( 2000)  r eport   t he r esult s of  a study i nt o 221 opi ate 
addi cts t hat   sought   me t hadone t r eatme n t   i n t he i nner-cit y area of  London bet w een 1995 and 
1998.   The  key  f i ndi ng  i n  t hi s r esearch wa s   t hat   duri ng  a six-m ont h  study  peri od  f or  t he  116  of 
t hese subj ects that  we r e fol l ow ed up,   heroi n use decreased by around 50% .   I n addi t i on,   t hi s 
r educed drug  use  wa s   associated wi t h  l ow er  l evels of  cri me .   I n  t erms   of  t he  econom i c i m pact,  
t he aut hors esti ma t e that  the benefi t s of six m ont hs m et hadone t r eatme n t  (a reduct i on i n 
i l l egal  earni ng  of  bet w een £2, 000  and  £7, 8000  per  addi ct)   com pared f avourably  wi t h  t he  costs 39
of  t he progra mme   ( approxi ma t ely £960 per  addi ct) .   Of   course,  t here are a num ber  of  caveats 
t hat  shoul d be m ent i oned.  Fi r stl y,  f r om  t hi s sm all  sam ple w e cannot  assum e that  all
me t hadone t r eatme n t   progra mme s   wi l l   be as successful :   not   all   heroi n addi cts wi l l   r espond i n 
t he  sam e wa y ,   and  over  t hree quart ers of  t he  addi cts i n  t he  study  we r e self -presenti ng.
Wh e t her or not  dem and-si de pol i cies have t he desi r ed eff ect rem ains t o be r esolved.  
Typi call y t hese pol i cies have not  received as m uch publ i c m oney as enforcem ent pol i cies 
aime d   at  r educi ng i m port s of  drugs i nt o t he UK.   Ho we v e r ,   since t he publ i cati on of  t he Ten -
year St r ategy m ore em phasis has been pl aced on harm r educt i on and general dem and si de 
i nt ervent i ons.   To  hel p young peopl e r esist  drug mi suse,  t he Un i t ed Ki ngdom  An t i -D rugs Co-
ordi nat i on Un i t   ( UKADCU) ,   vi a t he St r ategy,   has i ni t i ated t he del i very of  drug educati on i n 
school s through Personal ,  Soci al and H ealt h Educat i on ( PSHE) ,  wh i ch is incl uded i n t he 
Na t i onal  Cur r i culum ,  and t he N at i onal  H ealt hy School s progra mme  wh i ch is designed t o 
i mp l em ent PSHE.  In t erms  o f  m eeti ng t he obj ecti ve of prot ecti ng com m uni t i es fr om  drug-
r elated anti -social and cri mi nal  behavi our,  two  i ni t i ati ves have been i mp l em ented. The f i r st,  
t he arr est referr al schem e, seeks to reduce drug-related cri m e by encouraging probl em  drug 
users w ho  are arr ested t o  t ake up  appropri ate t r eatme n t   or  ot her  eff ecti ve  progra mme s   of  hel p.  
The second i ni t i ati ve w as t he pi l ot i ng of Dr ug Treatme n t  and Test i ng O rders (DTTO) .  A 
DTTO  enables a court ,   wi t h  t he  off ender’ s consent ,   t o  ma k e   an order  r equi r i ng  t he  off ender  t o 
undergo t r eatme n t  for drug m i suse. Ther e are m any ot her dem and-si de i ni t i ati ves bei ng
i mp l em ente d  b y  UKADCU,  but  as yet concl usi ve evaluat i on of thei r  eff ecti veness i s not  
avail able. Ho we v e r ,  alt hough t he Rat i onal  A ddi cti on m odel  predicts that  t he l i kel y
consequence of  t hese progra mme s   i s an i ncrease i n drug use,   one coul d argue t hat   ‘ m anaged’ 
drug users wi l l   probabl y  i m pose  l ow er  external   costs on  society.  
5. Concluding Remarks
W e began t hi s review  by consi deri ng t he cont r i but i on of the econom i c m odel  of Ra t i onal  
A ddi cti on t o t he st udy of addi cti ve behavi our.  B ecker and M urphy’s (1988) theory i s an 
i m port ant start i ng poi nt  in t he econom i cs li t erature as the aut hors show  that  addi cti ve,  and 
t ypi call y harmf ul ,  behavi our i s qui t e rati onal  i n t he sense t hat  i t  i nvol ves forwa r d-l ooki ng
ut i l i t y  ma x i mi sati on  wi t h  stable preferences.  Al t hough  t hi s mi ght   appear  at  odds wi t h wh a t   we  
know  about  addi cti ve behavi our,  the m odel  appears to adequat ely descri be pat t erns of drug 
use  t hat   have  been observed.   Empi r i call y,   t he  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel   has  been appl i ed i n  a 
num ber  of  cont exts.  I n t he ma j ori t y of  cases,  t he propert i es of  t he m odel   appear  t o hol d t r ue,  40
wi t h t he coeff i cients on past   and f ut ure consum pt i on f ound t o be stati sti call y signi f i cant  and 
posi t i ve,   and  t he  coeff i cient  on  curr ent  pri ce negat i ve  and  signi f i cant.
Beyond  t he  Ra t i onal   A ddi cti on  m odel ,   we   consi dered t he we l f are econom i cs f r am ew ork 
and saw  how  i t   i s a val uabl e t ool   f or  i dent i f yi ng t he r elevant  social  costs of  i l l i cit   drug use.   I t  
i s perhaps best   t hought   of  as a f r am ew ork f or  t hought ,   and clearl y i t   provi des a r ati onal e f or 
governm ent  int ervent i on.  For  exam ple, the fr am ew ork suggest  that  there are a num ber of 
external   costs of  drug  use,   such as cri me   and  healt h  care costs,  t hat   are not   t aken i nt o  account  
by t he i ndi vi dual   wh e n   ma k i ng hi s or  her  decision t o consum e drugs.   Thus by i nt erveni ng i n 
t he drugs ma r ket   and bri ngi ng about   a decrease i n consum pt i on,   t he subsequent   r educt i on i n 
society’s costs exceed t he r educt i on i n i ndi vi dual s’  benefi t s and overall   we l f are i s i mp r oved.  
On e   of  t he di f f i cult i es wi t h t hi s approach t o pol i cy r ecom m endati ons,   how ever,  is t hat   i t   i s a 
norma t i ve fr am ew ork t hat  accepts idea of consum er sovereignt y.  Thi s m akes it  incom pat i bl e 
wi t h t he rati onal e for int ervent i on t hat  com es fr om  t he i dea of ‘dem eri t  goods’,  wh e r eby 
i ndi vi dual s are t hought   not   t o act  i n t hei r   ow n best   i nt erests wh e n   t hey ma k e   t he decision t o 
consum e  pot enti all y  harmf ul   drugs.
Fi nal l y i n t hi s review  w e have seen that  econom i sts have at t em pted to furt her our 
understandi ng of t he relati onshi p bet w een enforcem ent pol i cies, pri ces, and consum er
behavi our.  Thi s w o rk represents a fundam ent al cont r i but i on t o furt heri ng our understandi ng 
of i l l i cit  drug use.  Ho we v e r ,  echoi ng t he concern of Br i dges (1999),  quot ed in t he
i nt r oduct i on t o t hi s paper,  pol i cy m akers and drug researchers do not  appear to have ful l y 
r ecogni sed thi s in t hei r  wo r k.  Thi s concern w as refl ected in a recent edit ori al of the j ournal  
Addi cti on:
…  It  i s not   onl y  bet t er pri ce dat a,  but   also bet t er analysi s t hat   are needed.  Pr i ces 
can only be underst ood i n t he cont ext of m arket  dynam i cs. Too oft en the t erm
“dem and” is used w hen consum pt i on i s m ore appropri ate, and suppl y i s equat ed 
simp l y w i t h t he t ot al quant i t y produced,  thus suppressing i m port ant behavi oral 
i ssues. Thi s is obvi ousl y a t ask for econom i sts, w ho are tr ained i n,  and obsessed 
by,  such analysi s, alt hough not  nearl y so good at  or i nt erested in dat a
coll ecti on… . Pr i ces are centr al to understandi ng drug pol i cy, but  they are poorl y 
m easured and analyt i call y m argi nal i sed. The devel opm ent  of bet t er pri ce data, 
along  wi t h  t hei r   analysi s,  w oul d  serve  we l l   bot h  r esearchers and  pol i cy  ma k e r s.
( Ca ul ki ns  and  Re ut er,   1999,   p.   1263).41
I n concl usi on,   i t   w oul d appear  t hat   econom i cs has a vi t al  r ol e i n drug pol i cy and drug 
r esearch, alt hough one cl ear om i ssion fr om  t he econom i cs li t erature is any subst anti al
r esearch i nt o t he nat ure of  drugs ‘ f i r ms ’ .   Cl earl y,   econom i sts need t o ma k e   advances i n t hi s 
area, as w e need to understand how  drug suppl i ers react to pol i cy int ervent i ons.  W e have a 
bet t er  understandi ng  of  how   consum ers r eact  t o  pri ces ( alt hough  we   sti l l   have  very  poor  pri ce 
dat a),   but   we   do not   know  how  suppl i ers r eact  t o changing costs,  especiall y non-di r ect  costs 
such as the ri sk associated w it h suppl yi ng i n an i l l egal ma r ket .  Ther e is also one fi nal
observat i on we   can ma k e   about   t he r eview  we   have presented here:  t hat   vi r t ual l y none of  t he 
em pir i cal  wo r k i n t he area of  t he econom i cs of  i l l i cit   drug use i s set  i n a Br i t i sh cont ext.   The 
r eason f or  t hi s i s simp l e:  i n t he UK,   dat a coll ecti on i s i ncredibl y sparse.  That   wh i ch exists i s 
t ypi call y  generated by sm al l ,   l ocali sed proj ects,  oft en f unded by t he Ho me   Of f i ce.  The  onl y 
t r ul y nat i onal   drug use i nforma t i on com es f r om  t he Br i t i sh Cr i me   Sur vey ( BCS) ,   but   t hi s has 
been cri t i cised as it  i s severely l i mi t ed in i t s appl i cati ons (see M acD onald (2000) and 
M acD onal d  and  Pudney(2000a)).
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